Acceptance of payments by the mortgagee after the defaults discharged the cause of action that arose from the defaults, and consequently the limitation period had to be computed from the date of fresh defaults.

( 1 ) THESE two second appeals arise out of two suits brought for recovery of possession of mortgaged property by the mortgagee against the mortgagor, The mortgage in one suit was executed on 10th October 1927 and stipulated that interest would be payable on 30th Jeth every year. A condition was attached that, in case the interest was not paid on the due date, the mortgagee would be entitled to take possession of the mortgaged property. No interest was paid in cash but between the years 1927 and 1931 two sarkhats were executed in respect of the interest due. Then on 19th July 1931, another mortgage, which is the basis of the second suit, was executed on 19th July 1931. In this mortgage also, there was a stipulation that the interest was to be paid on 30th Jeth every year and, in default of payment of interest, the mortgagee was to be entitled to tike possession. Neither of the two mortgages provided for any other re-medy for recovery of mortgage money. No-interest was paid in cash even subsequently. But the admitted facts are that, in respect of interest due up to 1937, sarkhats were executed by the mortgagor in favour of the mortgagees. Suits were also brought on the basis of these sarkhats and the amounts due under them were realised through Courts. These two suits were brought in january 1945 for recovery of possession. They were contested in both the lower Courts on the ground that they were time barred because both of them were brought more than twelve years after the first default had been made in payment of interest under each of the two mortgagees. On behalf of the plaintiff-respondents this question of limitation was mat on the argument that interest was paid until 1937 and hence limitation should be computed from that year and not from the first default made in 1928 and 1932.

( 2 ) IN these cases there is no doubt that, in respect of the first mortgage of 10th October 1927, a default was made in payment of the very first instalment and thereupon the right to sue for possession accrued to the mortgagee at once. Subsequently, however, the interest due was paid by execution of sarkhats and later still these sarkhats were converted into mortgage bonds of 19th July 1931. Thereafter again, there were defaults but these defaults were followed by execution of sarkhats and the payment of interest by such execution. The question to be considered is as to the effect that the payment by execution of sarkhats had on the question of cause of action and limitation. It is argued on behalf of the appellant in both the appeals that under Section 9, Lim. Act, when once time has began to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. It is, therefore, argued that, in respect of the first mortgage, when time began to run from the first Asarh in the year 1928 and, in respect of second mortgage, from the first of asarh in tee year 1932, limitation expired in 1940 and 1944. The suits which were brought in 1945 were, therefore, time-barred. The principle laid down under Section 9 cannot be disputed but this principle is subject to certain exceptions. Even where time has begun to run, it can be stopped provided the cause of action which had given the right to sue is discharged or in any way disappears. If the cause of action is discharged, the right to sue no longer exists and consequently the time will no longer continue to run.

( 3 ) IN the present cases, after the defaults had been made, payments were accepted by the mortgagee in respect of the amounts defaulted. Before these payments were accepted, the mortgagee had the right to bring suits and ask for possession. With the acceptance of these payments, the right of bringing the suits which had arisen on default disappeared. The acceptance of the payments amounted to a contract between the two parties by which the default made by the mortgagor in not making the payments on the due dates was condoned. Once the mortgagee had accepted the payments, he could no lon