( 1 ) THIS is a reference made by the Sessions Judge of Rae-Bareli against an order of the sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mandal, terminating proceedings under Section 145 o the Code of criminal Procedure on the ground that there was no longer any apprehension of a breach of the peace. The applicant before us made a complaint to the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the effect that there existed a dispute relating to certain plots of land, which was likely to cause a breach of the peace. The learned Magistrate being satisfied that such a dispute existed issued a preliminary order under Sub-section (1), in response to which he appeared before him and led evidence. He then dropped the proceedings by the order sought to be revised. He said in his order that the question before him was whether there was any apprehension of a breach of the peace or not, referred to the statement of the applicant himself to the effect that no quarrel had taken place regarding possession, and held that this statement proved that there was no apprehensioa of a breach of the peace and that there was no necessity of deciding which party was in possession. The order of the learned Magistrate was quite illegal and I cannot help feeling that he adopted the short cut in order to prevent further delay in the case that had already been pending for more than a year. This is not the way to do justice. The applicant being aggrieved by the order brought the matter to the notice of the Sessions Judge, who referred the case to this Court for quashing the order. The reference came before one of us who, on account of a conflict among authorities, referred it to a Bench.

( 2 ) IT is provided under Sub-section (1) that when a Sub-Divisional Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land, he must make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in the dispute to attend his court and to put in written statement of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession. Sub-Section (4) is as follows :--

"the Magistrate shall, then without reference to the merits or the claims of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute,. . . . . decide the question whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession of the said subject. " under the proviso to the sub-section he is empowered to attach the subject of dispute in case of emergency. This sub-section means that after the parties have appeared before the Magistrate all that he has to do is to decide which of them, if any, was in possession of the subject of the dispute on the date of the order made under Sub-section (1); he has no other jurisdiction, not expressly conferred by subsequent clauses, and cannot go into the question whether the order passed by him under Sub-section (1) was justified or not. Then comes Sub-section (5) which is as follows :--

"nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under Sub-section (1) shall be final. " this sub-section confers jurisdiction upon the Magistrate to cancel the preliminary order (e. g. the order made under Sub-section (1)), but only on the ground that the dispute involving a breach of the peace has ceased to exist or did not exist at all. If there existed a dispute at the time of the order but it did not involve a breach of the peace or if no dispute existed at all then, it means that a dispute involving a breach of the peace did not exist. If such a dispute existed then but subsequently it has ceased to involve a breach of the peace, or if it has ceased to exist at all, it