Once the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the danger of breach of peace has ceased, the basis of action under Section 145, Cr. P. C., is gone, and the Magistrate must immediately stay his hands. He has no jurisdiction to proceed further with the case or to embark upon any inquiry for the purpose of determining the question as to which party should be awarded possession.

( 1 ) THIS is a revision filed on behalf of Daurala Sugar Works which was first party in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It appears that Daurala Sugar works had, through their manager, made an application under Section 145, Criminal P. C. , alleging that the applicant was in cultivatory possession of plots Nos. 345, 331, 332, 334 and 301 total area of 12 Bighas and 8 Biswas in village Daurala at a rent of Rs. 93/- per annum; that the second party namely, Yograj Singh and others were threatening to take possession of the said plots, and that there was danger of apprehension, of breach of peace. It, accordingly, prayed that action under Section 145, Criminal P. C. , be taken in the case.

( 2 ) THE second party appeared in the case and filed a written statement. The proceedings under section 145, Criminal P. C. , went on in the usual way. On 15-4-1952, the proceedings terminated in the Magistrates Court and a final order under Section 145. Sub-section (6), was passed by the magistrate holding that the second party was in possession of the plots in dispute on the relevant date, and that the plots in dispute be released in their favour. Dissatisfied with this order, the first party went UP in revision before the Sessions Judge, who made a reference to the High Court recom-mending that the order of the Magistrate be set aside. On 21-10-1953, a learned single Judge of this -Court accepted the reference, set aside the order of the Magistrate dated 15-4-1952, and remanded the case to the Court of the Magistrate with a direction that the parties be given a fresh opportunity to produce further evidence, and, after considering the said evidence, the Magistrate should pass a proper order on merits. In the same order, the learned single Judge further directed that the second party would continue to remain in possession of the plots till the termi-nation of the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C.

( 3 ) THE case, accordingly, went back to the trial Court. After fresh evidence was recorded by the magistrate, the second party took an initial objection to the effect that the apprehension of the breach of peace had ceased to exist, and that the Magistrate had, therefore, lost jurisdiction to take action under Section 145, Cr. P. C. The Magistrate after hearing the arguments of the parties on the point, agreed with the contention of the counsel for the second party that there was no existing danger of breach of peace. He accordingly, passed an order on 15-6-1954 cancelling the preliminary order, staying all further proceedings in the case and releasing the land from attachment. Dissatisfied with the said order, the first party filed a revision in the Court of the iind Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut. The said revision having been rejected, the first party has filed this revision in the High Court.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant in this Court has advanced a number of arguments. He has argued that the Magistrate was wrong in coming to the conclusion that there was no apprehension of breach of peace and the order cancelling the proceedings was, therefore, an erroneous one. I have gone through the judgment of the learned Magisrtate, and am of opinion that his finding on this point is correct. As stated by the learned Magistrate, none of the witnesses adduced on behalf of the first party deposed that there was any existing danger of breach of peace in respect of the subject-matter of dispute. On the other hand, on behalf of the second party, Yograj Singh as D. W. 1 categorically stated that there existed no danger of the breach of peace in respect of this dispute. The Magistrate also referred to the fact that a long period of over two years and four months had elapsed since the date of application. Further, there had been no reports of any incident showing any apprehension of breach of peace in respect of the subject-matter in dispute. The Magistrate also referred to an application wh