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1956 Supreme(All) 221

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Desai and Beg, JJ.
DURGAPAL SINGH - Appellant
Versus
KUNWAR JAHAN SINGH - Respondents
Second Appeal 726 Of 1949
Decided On : 12/11/1956

Advocates Appeared:
A.N.Kaul, G.N.KUNZRU, Shankar Sahai Varma

Headnote:

JURISDICTION - U. P. TENANCY ACT - SECTION 180 - AMENDMENT - RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT - SUIT FOR EJECTMENT BY TENANT AGAINST TRESPASSER - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT BARRED - REVENUE COURT HAS JURISDICTION.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiffs, claiming to be tenants of the plots in dispute, sued the defendants for ejectment on the ground that they had taken unlawful possession of the plots. The suits were filed in a civil court. The defendants contested the suits on various grounds but not on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine them. The suits were decreed by the trial court and the lower appellate court. The defendants appealed to the High Court.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the suits. The court held that the amendment to Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, which gave revenue courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits for ejectment by tenants against trespassers, had retrospective effect. The court held that the amendment applied to the suits even though they were pending in a civil court when the amendment came into force. The court also held that the Explanation II added to Section 180 by the amendment, which allowed tenants to maintain suits for ejectment against trespassers in revenue courts, applied not only to pending suits but also to suits that were instituted after the amendment came into force.

Issues: 1. Whether the amendment to Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act had retrospective effect. 2. Whether the Explanation II added to Section 180 by the amendment applied only to pending suits or also to suits that were instituted after the amendment came into force.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The amendment to Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act had retrospective effect because it applied to suits that were pending in a civil court when the amendment came into force. The amendment barred the jurisdiction of the civil court to hear and determine the suits because it gave revenue courts exclusive jurisdiction over such suits. 2. The Explanation II added to Section 180 by the amendment applied not only to pending suits but also to suits that were instituted after the amendment came into force. The Explanation was meant to emphasize that a suit under Section 180 could be instituted by a tenant against a trespasser. The legislature wanted to change the law and consequently amended Section 180 (1) by deleting the words "as tenant". It added the explanation to make it clearer that a suit by a tenant against a trespasser was within the scope of section 180.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeals, set aside the decrees passed by the courts below, and remanded the cases to the trial court with the direction that it shall restore the suits to their original numbers and return the plaints to the plaintiffs for presentation to a competent revenue court.

DESAI, J.


( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the defendant against whom a decree for ejectment has been passed by the courts below. The connected appeal is by another defendant against whom in another suit a decree for ejectment has been passed by the courts below at the instance of the same plaintiffs. Since the same questions are involved in the two appeals they are being disposed of together.

( 2 ) THE respondents, claiming to be tenants of the plots in dispute in the two suits, sued the appellants for ejectment on the ground that they had taken unlawful possession of the plots: The suits were filed in the court of a Munsif. They were contested by the appellants on various grounds but not on the ground that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to hear and determine them. The defence failed in both the suits with the result that they were decreed. Appeals were filed against both the decrees; the appellants pleaded for the first time in the lower appellate court that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suits. The lower appellate court observed that they ought to have been instituted in a civil court and that the subsequent amendment to Section 180 U. P. Tenancy Act under which such suits should be instituted in a revenue court only had no retrospective effect and did not divest the learned Munsif of his jurisdiction to determine them. It dismissed the appeals and hence these Second Appeals. These appeals came up before our brother Upadhya, who finding that there was conflict of authority on the questions of law arising in them has referred them to a Bench for decision.

( 3 ) THE main question before us is of jurisdiction. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure a civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The suits in question were instituted in 1945 when the U. P. Tenancy Act No. XVII of 1939 was in force. Section 242 of it provided that:

"all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court, and no court other than a revenue court shall. . . . . take cognizance of any such suit. . . . . . based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit. "

Section 180, with which we would be concerned to these appeals, is one of the sections mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. At that time when the suits were instituted Section 180 provided that:"any person taking. . . . . possession of a plot or plots of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law. . . . . without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled. "

In the definition of the word tenant it is stated that the word includes a sub-tenant except when a contrary intention appears. In Ori Lal v. Ganeshi Lal, AIR 1947 Oudh 104 (FB) (A) it was decided by a Full Bench that a suit by a tenant against a trespasser would lie in a civil court and not In a revenue court under Section 180. One of the reasons advanced in support of the view was that the word tenant in Section 180 was not Intended to Include a sub-tenant and, therefore, a tenant of a plot of land could not be said to be entitled to admit a trespasser as tenant and consequently could not sue him under that section. It was on account of this decision that the respondents Instituted the suits in the court of the learned Munsif. Since they could not sue under Section 180, the jurisdiction of a civil court was not barred. While the suits were pending section 180 was amended by the U. P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act No. X of 1947. After the amendment section 180 read as follows :"a person taking. . . . . possession of a plot of land without the consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot. . . . shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so ent













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