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1955 Supreme(All) 140

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Roy, J.
PANCHO - Appellant
Versus
RAM PRASAD - Respondents
Criminal Revn. 1776 Of 1953
Decided On : 08/31/1955

Advocates Appeared:
S.B.JOHARI, S.N.MISRA

Headnote:

HINDU MARRIED WOMEN'S RIGHT TO SEPARATE RESIDENCE AND MAINTENANCE ACT, 1946 - SECTION 2(4) - RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT - WIFE ENTITLED TO SEPARATE MAINTENANCE FROM HUSBAND WHO MARRIED AGAIN BEFORE THE ACT.

Fact of the Case:

Wife filed an application under Section 488, Cr. P. C. for maintenance from her husband on the grounds of ill-treatment, being turned out of the house, and the husband taking a second wife. The husband admitted to taking a second wife but was willing to keep the wife under the same roof and provide for her maintenance. The Magistrate and Sessions Judge dismissed the application, holding that there was no systematic ill-treatment, polygamy is prevalent among Hindus, and the wife cannot claim separate maintenance on this ground.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that Section 2(4) of the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, is retrospective in nature and applies to wives superseded by a second marriage of the husband before the Act. The court found that the husband's statement that the wife was unchaste amounted to legal cruelty and that the wife was entitled to separate maintenance.

Issues: 1. Whether Section 2(4) of the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, is retrospective in nature. 2. Whether the husband's statement that the wife was unchaste amounted to legal cruelty.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the words "marries again" in Section 2(4) of the Act as merely descriptive of the position of the husband as a twice-married man at the date of the wife's claim for separate maintenance and not excluding a husband who has taken a second wife before the Act from its operation. 2. The court held that continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband that the wife is unchaste are all factors which may undermine the health of a wife and constitute legal cruelty.

Final Decision: The court allowed the application in revision, set aside the orders of the lower courts, and directed that the case be sent back to the trial court for a decision on the quantum of maintenance to be awarded to the wife.

ROY, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an application in revision by Srimati Pancho against an order passed on 29-8-1953, by the learned Sessions Judge of Fyzabad confirming an order dated 10-6-1953 passed by a learned magistrate dismissing the application of the applicant under Section 488, Cr. P. C. for maintenance claimed from the husband Ram, Prasad, the opposite party, in the sum of Rs. 50/-per month. The application of Smt. Pancho under Section 488, Cr. P. C. was founded upon three principal assertions, namely, that she was ill-treated by the husband and was turned out of the house by him about five years before the making of the application after having been beaten by him and that since then she is not cared for by him; secondly, that the husband has taken another wife about seven or eight years before the making of the present application; and, thirdly, that in proceedings before the Civil Judge the husband made a false imputation against her on 29-3-1952 that she is unchaste. The husband resisted the application on the ground that he never ill-treated the applicant and he never turned her out. He admitted that he took a second wife, but contended that he is, prepared to keep Smt. Pancho also under the same roof and to look after her maintenance. He further contended that the statement imputed to him as having been made by him on 29-3-1952, was made by him but it was not a correct statement and had been made in that litigation in order to suit the exigencies of the situation arising there. The learned Magistrate was of the opinion that there was "no systematic ill-treatment" by the husband; that petty quarrels used to crop up between the husband and the wife, but that cannot be a ground for permanent desertion by either party; that polygamy is prevalent amongst the Hindus, and that also cannot be a ground for the wife to desert the husband; land that "it will be a sorry day for the husbands if wives leave them on slight pretexts and then turn round and claim maintenance". The learned Magistrate accordingly dismissed the application for maintenance. The learned sessions Judge held in the revision petition filed before him by Smt. Pancho as against the order of the Magistrate that there was no systematic ill-treatment by the husband; that although on 29-3-1952, the husband had imputed unchastity to the wife, the imputation was made without any substance in order to meet the exigencies of the situation arising in that litigation; that the character of the wife is not bad; that the fact that the husband hag taken another wife does not entitle the wife to separate maintenance; and that the order of the learned Magistrate that Smt. Fancho was not entitled to separate maintenance was eminently just and proper,

( 2 ) SM. Pancho has preferred this application in revision before this Court against the order of the learned Sessions Judge. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that, having regard to section 2 (4), Hindu Married Womens Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (No. 19 of 1946), the applicant is entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband merely on the ground that he has married, for the second time and that, irrespective of the question as to whether there was ill-treatment or not, the maintenance cannot be refused. Section 2, Sub-clause (4) of Act No. 19 of 1946 seys that, notwithstanding any custom or law to the contrary, a Hindu married woman shall be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband on the ground, namely: (4) if he marries again. It has been argued by the other side that this section is not retrospective and reliance has been placed by the other side upon a decision of the Nagpur High Court in -- sukhribai v. Poh-kalsing, AIR 1950 Nag 33 (A), where it was observed that Act No. 19 of 1946 as a whole cannot be called a declaratory Act in the strict sense of the term; that Sub-clause (4) of Section 2 of the Act cannot be called declaratory, whatever one may say of



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