( 1 ) THIS is a defts second appeal against the appellate decree of Sri Grish Chandra, 1st Civil judge, Kheri, dated 27-5-1950.

( 2 ) IT appears that the plff. let out on rent to the deft. appellant a certain ahata within the municipal limits of the town of Lakhimpur-Kheri. After some time the plff. served on the deft. a valid notice to quit the premises and when he failed to do so, a suit for ejectment and damages was filed. An objection was taken that because the premises were situate within municipal limits, the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, applied and that as the plff. wanted the house for his own residential purposes, the previous permission of the District Magistrate was necessary before the suit could be filed. The plff. denied that the premises let out were accommodation within the meaning of the Act.

( 3 ) THE trial Court held that the premises constituted accommodation within the meaning of the act and as no previous permission of the District Magistrate had been taken, the suit was not maintainable. It was accordingly dismissed. On appeal the learned lower appellate Court has held that what was let out to the deft. was merely an ahata. His finding was:

"the evidence placed on the record would show that the ahata in question has pucca boundary walls with one main gate which has doors and shutters for it. The tin shed and the thatch shed inside the ahata are temporary constructions put in the ahata by the deft. resp. without the leave and consent of the plff. appellant. The existence of the tin shed and the thatch shed inside the enclosure walls of the ahata could not make the ahata in question a building as contemplated by Section 2 (a) of Act III [3] of 1947. "

The learned Civil Judge held that ahata itself cannot be considered to be a building within the meaning of the Act. The result was that as the notice for ejectment had been held to be valid, the plffs. suit was decreed.

( 4 ) THE only point urged in the second appeal before me is that the ahata itself constitutes a building within the meaning of the D. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In Section 2 (a) of the Act, accommodation means

"residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes (i) gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. "

It will be noticed that the key word in the definition is the word building. In the Act, the word building has not been defined. Therefore, we must give it the ordinary meaning which is consistent with the objects and purposes of the Act. In Websters New International Dictionary, 1926 edition, the meaning given to the word is: that which is built; specif. : (a) as now generally used a fabric or edifice, framed or constructed, designed to stand more or less permanently, and covering a space of land for use as a dwelling, store house, factory, shelter for beasts or some other useful purpose. Building in this sense does not include a mere wall, fence, monument, boarding or similar structure though designed for permanent use where it stands; nor a steamboat, ship or other vessel of navigation. " this shows that in the general sense a space of land should be covered by building and that mere wall or fence is not to be termed a building. That t he word building connotes a roofed structure within the meaning of the Act appears to be clear from the use of the word includes in Clause (a) of Section 2. Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) includes within the definition of accommodation, gardens, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building. If compounds had been intended to be considered as accommodation without reference to any building situate in them, the word in