IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Sapru and Bind Basni Prasad, JJ.
RAM CHANDRA - Appellant
Versus
THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF ALIGARH - Respondents
First Appeal 159 Of 1949
Decided On : 02/13/1951
UNITED PROVINCES (TEMPORARY) ACCOMMODATION REQUISITION ACT, 1947 - SECTION 3 - REQUISITION OF ACCOMMODATION - CONDITIONS - SUIT FOR INJUNCTION - MAINTAINABILITY - DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT - MEANING - SECTION 56 (D), SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff, a shop owner, filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from ejecting him from his shop, which had been requisitioned by the District Magistrate under the United Provinces (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (Act XXV [25] of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The plaintiff alleged that the requisition order was illegal as the District Magistrate had not provided him with suitable alternative accommodation as required by the Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the suit was maintainable as the District Magistrate had exceeded his authority by not complying with the conditions prescribed in Section 3 of the Act. The court further held that the District Magistrate was not a department of the government and, therefore, Section 56 (d) of the Specific Relief Act, which prohibits injunctions against departments of the government, was not applicable.
Issues: 1. Whether the suit for injunction was maintainable in light of Section 16 of the Act, which bars challenges to orders made under the Act in any court. 2. Whether the District Magistrate had acted within the powers conferred upon him by the Act. 3. Whether the District Magistrate was a department of the government and, therefore, immune from injunctions under Section 56 (d) of the Specific Relief Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 16 of the Act does not bar courts from examining whether an order impugned under the Act transgresses the limits prescribed for such orders or not. 2. The District Magistrate exceeded his authority by not complying with the conditions prescribed in Section 3 of the Act, which requires the District Magistrate to satisfy himself that suitable alternative accommodation exists for the person whose accommodation is being requisitioned or to provide him with such accommodation. 3. The District Magistrate is not a department of the government and, therefore, Section 56 (d) of the Specific Relief Act, which prohibits injunctions against departments of the government, is not applicable.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the decree of the trial court was set aside, and a permanent injunction was issued to the District Magistrate, the Town Rationing Officer, and the person to whom the shop had been allotted, restraining them from ejecting the plaintiff from his shop.
( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiffs first appeal. The case as put forward by the plaintiff was that he and his ancestors had been in possession of the shop in suit for a continuous period of 60 or 70 years, that they bad been carrying on kaserat business in that shop, that defendant 2, who is the rationing Officer of the town of Hathras was somehow improperly prevailed upon the defendant 3 to allot the shop in dispute to him under the United Provinces (Temporary) Accommodation requisition Act (Act XXv [25] of 1947), herein-after called the Act, on a representation to him that the shop was vacant and that no alternative accommodation had been provided to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs case was that it was not competent to the authority concerned to eject him, that he was protected by Act XXV [25] of 1947 and that the ejectment order was likely to affect his business somewhat seriously in his old age. On these allegations, the relief claimed by the plaintiff was that the Court might be pleased to issue a permanent injunction, restraining defendants 1 and 2, from ejecting him from the shop as also restraining defendant 3, from taking possession of it.
( 2 ) THE suit was resisted by defendants 2 and 3 on the ground, inter alia, that inasmuch as the requisition order was quite legal, its validity could not be challenged, having regard to Section 16 of the Act in any Court. Another plea that was taken was that the suit was bad inasmuch as defendant 2 had not been served with any notice under Section 80, Civil, P. C. It was further asserted by the defendants that the plaintiffs allegation that no suitable alternative accommodation had been provided by the defendants to him was wrong and that they had in fact provided such accommodation to the plaintiff. On the above facts, it was pleaded by defendants 2 and 3 that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction prayed for. The defence put forward by defendants 1 and 2 was supported in the main by defendant 3. The latter, however, added a further plea that he was a refugee and, after having left the West Punjab on account of the disturbances, had to take shelter in Hathras and that the shop in question was purchased by him in order to have a fresh start in life.
( 3 ) THE learned Additional Civil Judge dismissed the plaintiffs suit. He held that the notice given under Section 80, Civil P. C. , was a valid one and that the District Magistrate had acted, within the powers vested in him, in asking the plaintiff to vacate the shop and deliver its possession to defendant 3. He further held that inasmuch as the plaintiff had not been able to show that the order of the District Magistrate was illegal, the suit brought by him wag barred by Section 16 of the Act. The learned Judges view was that it was not, in any case, open to him under Section 56, specific Relief Act, to grant an injunction against the District Magistrate as to do go would be to interfere with the public duties with which the Provincial Government had vested the District magistrate. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court.
( 4 ) THE question for consideration is whether the decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge should be maintained and the injunction asked for refused to the plaintiff. The first question that needs to be determined is whether there is any substance in the argument that Section 16 of the act constitutes a bar to the plaintiffs suit. Section 16 of the Act reads as follows : "except as provided in this Act no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court. " the word "court" has been defined in Section 2 (b) of the Act to mean "the Court of a Munsif or Civil Judge, or where there is no Civil Judge the District Judge, who would have jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit for eviction of a tenant from accommodation in respect of which the question arises;"
( 5 ) THE argument
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