JUDGMENT

Seth, J. - The appellant in this case is the judgment-debtor. He objected to the execution of the decree against him, pleading that the application for execution was barred by limitation. This objection has been overruled by the lower Court although it was upheld by the Court of first instance. So the judgment-debtor has come up to this Court in second appeal, repeating the same objection.

2. The decree sought to be executed was passed ex parte, on 4th November 1933. The defendant applied under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P C., to have it set aside. This application was dismissed on 30th October 1934, and the appeal from the order dismissing this application was itself dismissed on 30th January 1936. The first application for execution was made on 12th November 1941, and was dismissed for default, eight days later, on 20th November 1941. The second application for execution, which has resulted in this appeal, was made on 3rd October 1944. It would be in time under Article 182 (5), Limitation Act, if the first application for execution was in time, and it would be beyond time, if that application itself was beyond time, for in that case it would not be an application made in accordance with law, capable of giving rise to a fresh period of J imitation.

3. It is undisputed that in computing the period of limitation for the first application for execution a period of three years, during which the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act (Local Act X [10] of 1937) remained in force, has to be excluded. It is obvious, therefore, that it was within time when made, if limitation for it is to be reckoned from 30th January 1936, the date when the appeal against the order under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P. C., was dismissed. It is equally obvious that it was beyond time, if limitation for it is to be reckoned from 4th November 1933, the date of the decree. It is further obvious that the limitation is to be reckoned from this last mentioned date unless Clause (2) in column III of Article 182 of schedule I, Limitation Act (hereinafter referred to as Article 182 (2)') applies to the case.

4. The contention on behalf of the decree-holder is that 'appeal' in Article 182 (2) means an appeal which imperils the decree sought to be executed' and therefore, the appeal from the order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree was an appeal contemplated by Article 182 (2) and the limitation for execution is to be reckoned from the date of the final order in that appeal. The contention on behalf of the judgment-debtor is that 'appeal' in Article. 182 (2) means an appeal from the decree sought to be executed and no other appeal, and that the appeal from the order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree was not an appeal contemplated by that Article.

5. The sole question for decision in this appeal is, which of these two opposing contentions is correct. Either party has supported his contention by a reference to decided cases, which are in no way reconcilable The judgment-debtor has this advantage, however, that the two cases decided by this Court, bearing on this point (and both of them are indistinguishable from this case) are in his favour. Ordinarily this should conclude the appeal in his favour, But it is submitted on behalf of the decree-holder that the view expressed in these two cases decided by this Court, has been overruled by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De 60 Cal. 1 : (A.I. R. 1932 P. C. 166), as interpreted by certain other High Courts, and requires reconsideration. We have thus been called upon to interpret ourselves Article 182 (2) once again according to its language, and also in the light of decided cases.

6. It has been stated that opposing views have been entertained about the correct interpretation of this Article. In this state of conflict, it is desirable, before adverting to decided cases to construe the clause independently, that is, according to its langua