SETH, J.

( 1 ) THE suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted in the Court of a Munsif to evict the appellant from an accommodation, occupied by him in the town of Baldeo as a tenant of the plffs.-respondents. It is not necessary to recapitulate the pleas raised in defence. It is sufficient to state that the Munsif overruled all of them and decreed the suit. The U. P. (Temporary) Control of rent and Eviction Act, III (3) of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was extended to the town of Baldeo during the pendency of the appeal by the deft, against the decree of the Munsif in the lower appellate Court. This enabled the deft, appellant to set up, in the lower appellate Court, an additional plea based on Section 15 of the Act which reads :

"in all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3. "

It was contended on his behalf that as the suit was not filed on any ground mentioned in Section 3 of the Act, a decree for eviction could not be passed against him therein. The lower appellate court repelled all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and dismissed the appeal. As regards the plea based on Section 15 it held, relying on a single Judge decision of this Court in northern India Coal Company v. Mst. Bitti Kuer, 1949 A W R 539, that the provisions of that section do not apply to appeals pending on the date of the commencement of the Act.

( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant contends that this view of the lower appellate Court is erroneous and relies upon niranjan Lal v. Mt. Ram Kali, AIR (37) 1950, All 396, in support of his contention. He submits that the section has not been correctly construed in northern India coal Cos. , case and that even if I do not accept this submission, I am bound to follow niranjan larv. Mt. Ram Kali Devi.

( 3 ) niranjan Lals case is a direct authority in support of the proposition that suit in Section 15 of the Act refers to a suit while it is before the Court of first instance as well as while it is before the appellate Court and that a tenant is entitled to claim the benefit of that section in an appeal pending on the date when the Act came into force. It is unfortunate that the aforesaid single judge decision was not brought to our notice when we decided niranjan Lal v. Mt. Ram Kali devi, although it had been published before then. Nevertheless it is not possible to hold that its authority has not been overruled by the decision of a Bench in niranjan Lal Bhargavas, case. I am, therefore bound to follow the construction approyed in niranjan Lals case and to reject the construction approved in northern India Coal Companys case. Notwithstanding this, the desire to ascertain whether anything said in that case would have induced us to hold otherwise, has led me to examine critically the reasoning upon which my learned brother Mushtaq Ahmad has based his conclusion.

( 4 ) ON an examination of the judgment in. northern India Coal Cos. case, it transpires that it was thought by my learned brother that certain words of Section 15 suggest that it was not intended to apply to appeals, for he observes.

". . . . . . . . . . the words no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 clearly suggest that they have reference to a stage before the passing of a decree in the suit. "

As my learned brother has not indicated how the words quoted by him suggest what he thinks they do, the only way in which the validity of his conclusion may be examined is to guess and consider the reasons which might have led him to it.

( 5 ) THE mere use of the future tense in no decree for eviction shall be passed does not in any way indicate that the section was not intended to apply to appeals, for, so long as an appeal remains pending, a decree yet remains to be passed therein in the future, a