Revision against the order for registration of FIR under Section 156 (3) Cr. P.C. is not legally maintainable for the prospective accused.

2. Heard learned A. G. A. for the State and perused the record.

3. By means of this revision, the prospective accused have challenged the order dated 11-9-2006 passed by Judicial Magistrate/ Additional Civil Judge (J. D.) IInd, Jaunpur in criminal misc. case No. 9 of 2006 (Vindhya-vasini v. Manish and others), whereby allowing the application moved by opposite party No. 2 Vindhyavasini under Section 156 (3) Cr. P.C., S.O.P. S. Sureri has been directed to register the case and investigate the same.

4. At the outset, it was contended by learned A. G. A. that revision against impugned order is not legally maintainable, as the order of registration of F. I. R. cannot be challenged in revision at the instance of prospective accused and if they are aggrieved by the F. I. R., then they can invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

5. Having, given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned A.G. A., I agree with his contention that revision against impugned order is not legally maintainable.

6. In the case of Karan Singh v. State (1997 (34) ACC 163), this Court has observed as follows :-

"Where an order is made under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. directing the police to register FIR and investigate the same, the Code no- where provides that the Magistrate shall hear the accused before issuing such a direction, nor any person can be supposed to be having a right asking the Court of law for issuing a direction that an FIR should not be registered against him. Where a person has no right of hearing at the stage of making an order under Section 156 (3) or during the stage of investigation until Court takes cognizance and issues process, he cannot be clothed also with a right to challenge the order of the Magistrate by preferring a revision under the Code. He cannot be termed as an "aggrieved person" for purpose of Section 397 of the Code."

7. At the stage of Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C., any order made by the Magistrate does not adversely affect the right of any person, since he has got ample remedy to seek relief at the appropriate stage by raising his objections. It is incomprehensible that accused cannot challenge the registration of F. I. R. by the police directly, but can challenge the order made by the Magistrate for the registration of the same with the same consequences. If the accused does not have a right to install the investigation, but for the limited grounds available to him under the law, it surpasses all suppositions to comprehend that he possesses a right to resist registration of F. I. R.

8. In the case of Rakesh Puri and another v. State of U. P. and another 2006 (56) ACC 910 : (2007 (1) ALJ 169) the following observations have been made by this Court :-

"To sum up the discussions made above it is clear that the alleged accused has no right to challenge an order passed under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. at precognizance stage by a Magistrate and no revision lay against such an order at the instance of the alleged accused under Section 397 (1) Cr. P. C. being barred by Section 397 (2) Cr. P. C. nor at his instance an application under Section 482 Cr. P. C. is maintainable for the simple reason that if cognizable offence is disclosed in an application filed by the aggrieved person, then his such an application must be investigated to bring culprits to books and not to thwart his attempt to get the FIR registered by rejecting such an application which will not amount to securing the ends of justice but will amount to travesty of it."

9. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Smt. Rekha Verma and others v. State of U. P. and others 2007 (57) ACC 241 : (2007 (1) ALJ (NOC) 123) in which, it is held that order passed under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. to direct registration of the case is not revisable and application under Section 482 Cr. P. C. also is not maintainable.

10. In the case o