Filing objections to an injunction application is not a step in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and does not disentitle the defendant from claiming a stay of proceedings.

M. N. SHUKLA, J. :- The question in this appeal is whether the proceedings instituted by the plaintiff respondent by filing a suit in forma pauperis should have been stayed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred as the Act ). A few facts leading to the present appeal may be noted as follows :

2. The plaintiff-respondent Mastan Singh made an application for leave to file a suit in forma pauperis against M/s. Hindustan Finance Company, R. N. Grover, and Ram Shah, the latter being the partners of the Company. The relief claimed in the suit was a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to restore possession of a truck of which they had been forcibly deprived by the defendants. The suit was instituted on 20th Sept, 1975. On 16th Oct. 1975, the plaintiff applied for a temporary injunction. To this application objections were filed by M/s. Hindustan Finance Company and R. N. Grover, Managing Partner, on 12-12-1975. Thereafter on 9-1-1976 Ram Shah defendant applied under S. 34 of the Act praying that the suit be stayed inasmuch as the parties had by means of an agreement decided to have the matters referred to arbitration, the plaintiff Mastan Singh opposed this application on the ground that the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, having filed objections against the application for temporary injunction, were disentitled from applying under Section 34 of the Act. In the plaintiffs objection it was also alleged that the arbitration agreement was not genuine and contained additions and interpolations. The objections found favour with the court below and it held that since the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had by filing objections against the application for temporary injunction taken steps in the proceedings in the suit and the arbitration agreement was also suspicious, the application under S. 34 of the Act must be dismissed. The application was in these circumstances rejected and that order has been challenged in this appeal.

3. The short question, therefore, which arises for our consideration is as to whether on these facts the application under S. 34 of the Act was liable to be dismissed. S. 34 of the Act reads :

" Where any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming under him in respect of any matter agreed to the referred, any party to such legal proceedings may, at any time before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are pending to stay the proceedings: and if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement and that the applicant was at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, such authority may make an order staying the proceedings."

A party is entitled to claim the benefit of the above provisions, provided he invokes such benefit before :-

(i) filing a written statement, or

(ii) taking any other steps in the proceedings.

It is quite clear that if a party chooses to avail himself of the binding effect of an arbitration agreement, he must not submit to the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit or other legal proceedings have been instituted. If he either files a written statement or takes any other steps in the proceedings, his conduct would amount to abandoning the arbitration agreement and it would be referable to his intention to submit to the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit or the other legal proceedings have been instituted.

4. Before, however, an application under S. 34 of the Act can be thrown out on account of any such conduct of the applicant, it has to be carefully ascertained as to whether the unequivocal intention to abandon the arbitration agreement can be attributed to him. Every osten