ORDER :- The applicants filed a suit against the opposite parties in the court of the Civil Judge, Varanasi. On the application of the plaintiffs, an ex parte ad interim injunction was issued against the defendants. When the defendants appeared, they moved an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for staying the hearing of the suit as there was a binding agreement between the parties to refer the dispute to arbitration. This application was allowed on January 14, 1972, Thereafter the defendants moved an application that the ex parte ad interim injunction be vacated. The plaintiffs raised an objection that, after the stay of the hearing of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the injunction matter. By its order dated May 6, 1972, the trial Court held that the injunction matter could be disposed of by it and fixed May 20, 1972, for its disposal. Against this order, the plaintiffs filed a revision before the District Judge, Varanasi. The District Judge rejected the revision summarily, holding that the order of the trial court did not amount to a case decided and that the stay of a suit did not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to dispose of interlocutory matters. The plaintiffs have now come up to this Court in revision.

2. The trial court has relied on certain decisions based on the provisions of Section 41 of the Arbitration Act in coming to the conclusion that it has jurisdiction to dispose of interlocutory matters, even though the hearing of the suit is stayed under Section 34. Some decided cases, in which Section 41 has been interpreted, were cited before me also. Section 41 reads thus :-

"41. Procedure and powers of Court - Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules made thereunder -

(a) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court, and to all appeals, under this Act, and

(b) the Court shall have, for the purpose of and in relation to, arbitration proceedings, the same power of making orders in respect of any of the matters set out in the second Schedule as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before the Court :

Provided that nothing in clause shall be taken to prejudice any power which may be vested in an arbitrator or umpire for making orders with respect to any of such matters."

In the second Schedule, which enumerates the powers of Court, clause (4) relates to interim injunctions and the appointment of Receivers. Thus, under Section 41, the Court can grant injunctions and appoint Receivers. But I think that Section 41 has no application to the present case. There are two types of cases in which the provisions of the Arbitration Act can be invoked. The first type is pending suits in which applications under certain provisions of the Arbitration Act can be made. Examples of such applications are applications under Section 21 for referring any matter in dispute in a suit to arbitration and applications under Section 34 for staying the hearing of a suit. The second class of cases is where no regular suit has been filed but proceedings are initiated in a court by an application made under the Arbitration Act. Instances of such cases are applications under Section 14 for filing an award in court and applications under S. 20 for filing an arbitration agreement in court. It is to this second class of cases that Section 41 applies, for, in the first class of cases, the court hearing a regular suit already has power under the Code of Civil Procedure to grant injunctions and to appoint receivers. The definition of the word 'court' in Section 2(c) also points to the same conclusion. 'Court' is defined to mean a civil court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. The definition indicates that the word 'court' here does not mean the court before

which a suit has actually be