Irrebuttable presumptions in a statute may be rules of evidence or substantive law, depending on whether the facts from which the presumptions are drawn are inherently relevant in proving the existence of the presumed facts.

D. M. CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. :- This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, had come up in the first instance, before a learned single Judge, K. C. Agarwal, J. The order of reference made by his Lordship reads thus:-

"The question raised by the learned counsel for the parties is, in my opinion, of general importance and is likely to arise in a number of other petitions, and as my judgment could not be a subject-matter of appeal to a Division Bench, it appears appropriate to refer this case to a larger Bench for deciding the following questions :

1. Whether the irrebuttable presumption incorporated in Explanations (ii) and (iv) of S. 21 is of substantive law or procedure expressed in presumptive form?

2. Whether S. 14 (2) of U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 deleting Explanations (ii) and (iv) is retrospective in operation?

3. Whether the law, as amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, is to be given effect to in the present writ proceedings?

2. Under Cl. (b) of the proviso to R. 2 of Chapter V of the Rules of this High Court, a Judge may, if he thinks fit, refer a case which may be heard by a Judge sitting alone or any question of law arising therein for decision to a larger Bench.

3. A question arises whether the learned single Judge has referred to the Division Bench the whole case or only certain questions of law. His Lordship has formulated three questions. But he has also stated that it appeared appropriate to refer the case to a larger Bench for deciding those questions. Reading the order of reference as a whole, we are inclined to construe it as referring the entire case to a Division Bench.

4. The writ petition is directed against the order of the 1st Additional District Judge, Meerut, dated 12-2-1976, passed in an appeal under S. 22 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner herein is the tenant and respondent 2 herein is the landlord. For the sake of convenience, they will hereafter be referred to as the tenant and the landlord respectively.

5. The landlord had made an application under sub-s. (1) of S. 21 of the Act for eviction of the tenant from a part of the house bearing Nos. 226 and 228 Dalampara, Meerut City, and for release of the accommodation in her (the landlords) favour. Her case was that she was residing in a part of that house, that the tenant was occupying the remaining part thereof and that she needed the entire house for her own occupation since the portion in her occupation was insufficient for her large family. The tenant disputed the landlords claim that she bona fide needed additional accommodation. He pleaded that he would be put to great hardship and inconvenience if he should be evicted from the portion of the building he was occupying.

6. The prescribed authority held that the need of the landlord for additional accommodation was not genuine and bona fide, that she had already sufficient accommodation in the portion of the house she was occupying and that no additional accommodation was required for her. He also held that greater hardship would be caused to the tenant if his eviction was ordered than the hardship to the landlord if eviction was refused.

7. In the appeal preferred by the landlord, the learned District Judge held that in view of Cl. (iv) of the Explanation to sub-s. (1) of S. 21 of the Act, the fact that the landlord was occupying a portion of the building, was conclusive proof that the building was bona fide required by her. In view of the ruling of the Full Bench of this Court in Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge (AIR 1976 All 328), the learned District Judge did not go into question of comparative hardship, namely, the hardship caused to the tenant by eviction compared with the hardship caused to the landlord by refusing the petition.

8. In this petition, the learned counsel for the tenant contended that Cls. (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to sub-s. (1) of S. 21 of the Act, have since be