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1973 Supreme(All) 237

Allahbad High Court
SATISHCHANDRA,M.N.SHUKLA,K.B.SRIVASTAVA
Syed Ajaz All Khan - Appellant
Versus
Mohammad Refiq - Respondent
Decided On : 12/12/1973

Advocates:
K.C. Saksena and N. Ally Khan, for Appellants; S.N. Verma, S.J. Hyder and Standing Counsel, for Respondents.

Headnote:

RENT CONTROL AND EVICTION ACT - ORDER PASSED BY STATE GOVERNMENT - CANCELLING ORDER OF ALLOTMENT - RELEASING ACCOMMODATION IN FAVOUR OF LANDLORD - ORDER PASSED UNDER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 7 - WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7-A(1) OF THE ACT.

Fact of the Case:

The question referred to the Full Bench was whether an order passed by the State Government cancelling an order of allotment and directing the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord passed in revision filed under Section 7-F of the Rent Control and Eviction Act is an order passed under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act within the meaning of Sec. 7-A (1) of that Act.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the order passed by the State Government cancelling an order of allotment and directing the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord passed in revision filed under Section 7-F of the Rent Control and Eviction Act is an order passed under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act within the meaning of Sec. 7-A (1) of that Act.

Issues: Whether an order passed by the State Government cancelling an order of allotment and directing the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord passed in revision filed under Section 7-F of the Rent Control and Eviction Act is an order passed under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act within the meaning of Sec. 7-A (1) of that Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the State Government has a power of vast amplitude, which includes the power to pass the same order which the District Magistrate could pass under Section 7 or which he or the Commissioner can pass under Section 7-A; and that this power admits of no abridgement inhibition or restriction. The powers are co-extensive while each is working within the sphere of his or its own power.

Final Decision: The Court answered the question referred to the Full Bench in the affirmative.

Judgement

K.B. SRIVASTAVA, J. :- This reference to a Full Bench arises out of a special appeal filed against an order of a learned Single Jute who, placing reliance upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Krishna Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P., 1962 All LJ 426, allowed the writ, petition in part. The Division Bench, which heard the special appeal, felt that the decision in Krishna Chandra Sharma's case required reconsideration and It has, therefore, referred the following question for the consideration of this Full Bench :-

"Whether an order Passed by the State Government cancelling an order of allotment and directing the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord passed in revision filed under Section 7-F. of the Rent Control and Eviction Act is an order Passed under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act within the meaning of Sec. 7-A (1) of that Act"

2. In Krishna Chandra Sharma's case, 1962 All LJ 426 the original order of allotment was made in favour of one person and when that order was cancelled subsequently by the District Magistrate, the accommodation was split up into two separate portions and while one portion was re-allotted in favour of the original allottee, the second portion was ordered to be let out to another person, On the filing of a revision petition by the, original allottee, the State Government, acting under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), cancelled both the allotment orders and allotted the whole accommodation in favour of the original allottee, who applied for initiation of proceedings under Section 7-A (1) of the Act for the eviction of the second person on the ground that he was in occupation of the accommodation in contravention of the order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F in relation to an order passed earlier by the District Magistrate under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7. On these facts, two Questions of law were canvassed before the Division Bench (M.C. Desai, C.J. and S.D. Singh J.) in that case. The first question was whether a person, who is in occupation of an accommodation on the basis of an order passed by a District Magistrate under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Act can be said to be in occupation 'in contravention of the said order' in the sense in which these words occur in Sub-Section (1) of Section 7-A, if the State Government, exercising its powers under Section 7-F subsequently cancels it and allots the accommodation in favour of another person. The question was answered in the negative and it was held that such a Person would on the contrary he a person in occupation of the accommodation under an order passed under Sub-Section (2) of S. 7. The second question was whether in the circumstances stated above, a notice under Sub-Section (1) of Section 7-A can be issued against the person in occupation, that is to say, against a person who is in occupation in consonance with an order passed by the District Magistrate under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 but in contravention of the order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F. After quoting Sub-Sec. (it of Section 7-A and adopting the primary rule of literal construction, the Division Bench answered this second question, to use its own language in the following terms :

"There must, therefore, be an order under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 requiring an accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person,, and an order tinder Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 can be passed only by a District Magistrate. It may be that the order passed under Sub-Sec. (2) of Section 7 is liable to be revived by the state Government under Section 7-F, but Sub-Section (1) of Section 7-A contemplates action being taken only in respect of the contravention of an order Passed under Section 7(2) and not an order passed under Section 7-F. The language of the section is plain and can admit of no two interpretati









































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