M.N. SHUKLA, J. :- On account of divergence of opinion between two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Narain Tewari v. Brij Narain, AIR 1931 All 326 and Lalji v. Gajadhar, AIR 1962 All 431 this Execution Second Appeal filed by a judgement-debtor had been referred to a Full Bench.

2. The short facts of the case are that the respondent decree-holder obtained a compromise decree on 27-1-1954 for possession over the plots in dispute after demolition of certain constructions said to have been raised by the judgement-debtor. The compromise decree provided that the judgement-debtor would remove the constructions and deliver possession of the properly to thc decree-holder after the latter served him with a notice giving him two months' time to remove the constructions. According to the compromise device the decree-holder could serve notice upon the judgment-debtor whenever the former desired to make his own constructions over the said land. It was further provided in the compromise decree that in default of the judgement-debtor in removing his constructions and delivering possession on service of notice the decree-holder shall be entitled to execute the decree for possession. The decree-holder served a notice on the judgement-debtor on 22-10-1962. asking him to deliver possession of the land as provided in the compromise decree. The judgement-debtor did not deliver possession and hence the decree-holder filed an application for execution of the decree on 2-5-1963. That application was dismissed as not maintainable in law on 22-5-1963 without notice to the judgment-debtor. On 21-6-1963 the decree-holder made an application under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code for recalling the order dated 22-5-1963 and for proceeding with the execution of the decree. That application was allowed by the learned Munsif on 31-8-1963 and the order dated 22-5-1963 was recalled. Notice was issued to the judgement-debtor who filed objections dated 25-1-1964 to the execution application, including the objection that the order under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code was not competent. The judgement-debtor's main objection however, was that the execution application, having been made after six years of the decree, was barred by limitation. The learned Munsif dismissed the objections and held that, the execution application was not barred by limitation. The judgement-debtor preferred an appeal which was dismissed and the order passed by the learned Munsif was affirmed. The present second appeal is directed against the orders of the courts below.

3. It, was faintly submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the order of the learned Munsif under Sec. 151, Civil Procedure Code recalling his previous order dated 22-5-1963 and restoring the execution application was illegal. According to his contention the previous order was applicable and the decree-holder having failed to avail himself of the remedy of appeal, the court could not proceed under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code. This argument of the learned Counsel is completely devoid of substance. On this point it would be sufficient to say that a perusal of the order sheet of the case shows that the order dated 22-5-1963 dismissing the execution application was passed inadvertently in the routine manner without hearing the decree-holder, despite the earlier order expressly saying that the decree-holder's application be heard in the presence of the counsel. I was thus an error of the court and it is axiomatic that no prejudice should be caused to a party on account of an error committed by the court. Hence the remedy of appeal notwithstanding the learned Munsif could act ex debito justitiae in order to correct his own error. The order dated 31-8-1963 was, therefore, perfectly valid and the execution court rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction to recall the previous order.

4. The main point which has been canvassed on behalf of the appellant is that the orders of the courts below