JAGMOHAN LAL, J. :- The only point that arises for decision in this second appeal is the validity or otherwise of a notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, which was served in this case by the plaintiff-respondent on the defendant-appellant.

2. In present days of scarcity of accommodation litigation between Landlord and tenant has greatly increased. Most of the litigation centres round the question of the validity of the notice by means of which the tenancy is sought to be put an end to by the landlord. Though the general principles governing the validity of such notices have fairly been settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and Full Bench and Division Bench decisions of this Court, in some individual cases discordant observations have been made by some learned Judges. The reference of this second appeal to this Bench is also the result of some divergent views expressed by two learned Judges of this Court in their decisions while considering the validity of the individual notices that came before them for interpretation. Though the learned single Judge who referred this second appeal to a Division Bench has not noted those decisions containing the divergent views, we are told by the learned counsel for the appellant that the reference is to H.Z. Islam v. Mohd. Raft reported in 1971 All WR (HC) 121 : (AIR 1971 All 302) decided by K.B. Asthana, J., and Phool Chand v. Jagdish Prasad reported in 1971 All WR (HC) 456 decided by C.G.P. Singh J. As the question is of general Importance usually arising in litigation of this nature, we propose to consider it in detail for the guidance of the subordinate courts.

3. The tenancy which was sought to be determined under the notice in question issued by the landlord was a month to month tenancy for a purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing purpose governed simply by Section 106 and there being no contract or local law or usage to the contrary governing that tenancy. The relevant provision of Section 106 relating to such tenancy lays down that a lease of immovable property for a purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor of lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy This section has beer, amended in its application to our State. The amended section provides that such lease shall be terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by thirty days' notice. The section further lays down that every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.

4. From the above provision it is evident that this section firstly lays down a rule of presumption that in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for purposes other than agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month. In the second place, it lays down how such a lease would be terminable. The mode of such termination as provided in this section is by a thirty days' notice given by the lessor or lessee. It further provides that the notice shall be in writing sent by or on behalf of the person giving it. Lastly it prescribes the mode of service of that notice. But the section does not prescribe any form of the notice or the actual language that is to be used in drafting that notice. So long as the essential conditions laid down in this section are complied with and the notice expressly or impliedly gives out the intention of the notice-giver to terminate the lease it will be a valid notice to determine the lease on the expiry of the requisite period of the notice.

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