JUDGMENT :- This is a tenant's appeal in which the judgment of the lower appellate Court has been assailed mainly on the ground that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid so far as the notice did not allow the period of thirty days to the defendant mentioned in the section.

2. There is no dispute that the notice is dated 31-1-1967. There is also no dispute that this notice was received by the defendant on 7-2-1967. There is a mention in this notice Ext. 4 that the tenancy is being terminated with effect from 8th of March, 1967 and the tenant was directed to vacate the premises on 9th of March. There is also no controversy that if 7th February, 1967, the date on which the notice was received by the tenant, and 8th March, 1967, the date on which the tenancy was terminated, are included within the period of thirty days, then the notice was well within law as the period of thirty days was allowed, but if these two days or any of these days is excluded, then the time will fall short of the statutory period mentioned under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the notice will be certainly invalid.

3. It has, therefore, to be seen as to whether the date on which the notice is received by the tenant and the date on which the tenancy is terminated are to be excluded or included while computing the thirty days mentioned in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant, contended that Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act would not apply to the facts of the case because the statute i. e. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is in itself quite clear and the question of application of the above two sections of the General Clauses Act does not arise. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act says that if the period commences from a particular date and ends on a particular date, then the date from which it begins and the date to which it ends shall be excluded. At this stage, it will be necessary to refer to the wordings of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which reads as below:

"In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural and manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy".

5. We are not concerned with the second part of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, it is not being quoted in this judgment.

6. In 1954, by U. P. Amendment Act (XXIV), an amendment was made by this State in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the words "expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy" and "expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy" were excluded and the words "fifteen days' notice" were substituted for "thirty days' notice".

7. Thus a plain reading of this section will show that the notice had to be terminated by thirty days. Thus the words "from" and "to" neither precede nor follow the time given in this section. In this view of the matter, I don't think the provisions of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act would apply to the facts of this case and the section has to be Interpreted independently of the aforesaid two sections of the General Clauses Act. Even Section 10 of the General Clauses Act too does not apply to this section. Applying the general principle of interpretation, it has to be seen as to what the Legiskture meant by the words "by thirty Days". There is no dispute that this High Court as well as other High Courts in a series of decisions have held that the period mentioned in the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act must be a clear period of f

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