S. N. KATJU, J. :- The two questions which has been referred to us for our opinion are as follows :-

1. Whether the State Government acts as a quash-judicial authority when deciding a case relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for filing a suit in the civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation? Whether the State Government is bound to give reasons for its orders under Sec. 7-F of the U. P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in proceedings arising out of an application under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to file a suit in a civil court for the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation?

2. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments of my brothers Khare and Mathur and I am inclined to agree with my brother Khare. The Majority view of our Full Bench in Haji Manzoor Ahmad v. State of U. P., 1968 All LJ 809 : (AIR 1970 All 467 (FB)) in which it was held that proceedings under Section 7-F of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are quasi judicial in character, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, 1965 All LJ 353 : (AIR 1965 SC

1767). The Supreme Court further reaffirmed the aforesaid view in Vasudeo Chaube v. Vaidya Nand Kishore, 1968 All LJ 1021. My answer to the first question, therefore, is in the affirmative.

3. The answer to the second question is not free from difficulty. The Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606 overruled its earlier decision in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671. On an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India from an order of the Central Government it was held that the Central Government should have passed a speaking order. The same view was expressed in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in Prag Das Umar Vaishya v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 657 of 1967, D/-17-8-1967 (SC); State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narsinghdas Janki Das Mehta. Civil Appeal No. 681 of 1966, D/- 29-4-1969 : (reported in AIR 1969 NSC 115); M/s. Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 2252 of 1966, D/-28-10-1969 (SC) and State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, AIR 1969 SC 1297. The following observations were made by Subba Rao, J. in his minority judgment in AIR 1966 SC 671 (supra).

"There is no essential distinction between a Court and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency, but, an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to

give reasons for their orders."

4. It may be desirable that a Tribunal while passing its order in a case referred to it in revision, as it was in the cases before us, should give its reasons for the decision arrived at by it. Such an order passed by a Tribunal may be questioned before the Supreme Court on appeal under Art. 136(1) of the Constitution or it may be challenged before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and it may be proper that the Supreme Court or the High Court should have the benefit of examining the reasons on the basis of which the Tribunal had arrived at its decision. But there appears to be no provision under Section 7-F of the Act which can compel, as a matter of law, the State Government to record its reasons while passing an order under Section 7-F of the Act. It may be desirable for the State Government to record its reasons while giving its decision in proceedings under Section 7-F of the Act. But as lo