This rivision has been filed by the State of U. P. against the judgment of the Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Etawah, dated July 2, 1975, discharging the opposite parties Nos. l to 3 as well as Raghuraj Singh and Mahesh of the charges under sections 395 and 412 I. P. C.

It appears that on a charge sheet submitted by the police, the Magistrate committed five accused persons viz. Raj Bahadur, Mukat Singh and Vishram Singh, opposite parties Nos. l to 3, as well as Raghuraj Singh and Mahesh, under section 395 and 412 I. P. C. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 227 Cr. P. C. , 1973, the learned Sessions Judge examined the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and being of the opinion that no sufficient ground for proceeding against the five accused, named above, existed, he discharged them. Against this order the present revision has been filed against the opposite parties Nos. l to 3. This would show that the State of U. P. has not preferred any revision against the discharge of Raghuraj Singh and Mahesh. I am, therefore, concerned with the correctness of the order of discharge against opposite parties Nos. l to 3 only.

As stated above, the opposite parties were committed to the court of session for trial under sections 395 and 412 l P. C. On a persual of the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge discharged Raj Bahadur as there was only one witness Taley Singh who had identified him in the identification parade. Mukat Singh and Vishram Singh were, however, discharged by the learned Sessions Judge on the finding that they being residents of the neighbouring village could not have committed the dacoity in the house of the complainant.

The question that was raised by the learned counsel for the State was that under Section 227 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Sessions Judge did not have jurisdiction or power to scrutinise the evidence elaborately and record a finding on the truthfulness of the allegations on the basis of the materials which came before him at that stage. At: this place it may be relevant to quote the provisions of Section 227 of the new Code, which reads as under :

"if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submission of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. "

A reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that a Sessions Judge can discharge an accused if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, he finds that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The finding required to be recorded by the Sessions Judge, there-fore, has to be with regard to the fact as to whether sufficient ground exists in a particular case for discharging the accused or not. It is truism that the word "sufficient" is not the same word as and has not the same meaning as "conclusive". The fact is that the proper interpretation of the words depends upon the context in which they are placed and I think one must fined some contest of a compelling nature before one decides that the word "sufficient" has the same meaning as "conclusive". In my opinion, the word "sufficient" is a relative term. It requires reference to some end or purpose. In the present controversy, it only means that the materials mention-ed in Section 227 Cr. P. C. must be such that they make out a prima facie case and the same must not be determinative in itself. It may be material to be noted that Section 227 of the new Code corresponds to sub-section (2) of Sec. 251-A of the old Code. Sec. 25i-A of the old Code has been the subject matter of interpretation in several cases by this Court and the Supreme Court. In this connection, r