This Full Bench has been constituted on a refer ence made by a Division Bench for deciding the following two questions:

I. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would, by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the said Act, apply to revision filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing it ?

2. If the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable, will the principle contained in the said section apply to a revision filed as referred to in question No. 1 ?

The facts necessary for appreciating the controversy involved in the present case are these: The petitioner made an application for the grant of a permit on Chandpur-Bijnor-via-Haldwani route. The permit was granted to the petitioner. The permit, however, contained certain conditions. Aggrieved by the conditions imposed in the permit, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The revision had been filed beyond the period of limitation pres cribed by the proviso to Section 64-A of the said Act. The proviso lays down that a revision has to be filed by a person aggrieved within thirty days from the date of the order. Having found that the revision had been filed beyond the limitation prescribed, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dismissed the same on July 28, 1975. The Tribunal repelled the contention of the petitioner that the delay in filing the revision under Section 64-A was condonable under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It held that since the Tribunal was not a Court, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act were not

applicable to the proceedings before it. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed the writ petition which came up for hearing before a Division Bench.

Placing reliance on a decision of a Division Bench, in Qasimuddin v. Assistant Sugar Commissioner-cum- Appellate Authority, Bijnor 1974 A. L. J. 137 and Compe tent Authority 1974 A. L. J. 813 the petitioner contended that the Motor Vehicles Act being the special law, Section 5 of the Limitation Act was attracted to the revision filed by the petitioner under Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Having felt doubt about the correctness of the view taken in aforesaid two cases, the Bench made the present reference.

The question is, whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereafter referred to as the Act of 1963) confined in its operation to proceed ings before Court. It is not necessary for us to mention about the law of limitation in India before the Act, 1908. It would, however, suffice to men tion that even before the enforcement of the Limitation Act, 1908, attempts were made to introduce a uniform law of limitation applicable alike to Courts established by the Royal Charter and other Courts (See: Third Law Commis sion Report page 2 ). The preamble to the Limitation Act, 1908 says:

"whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications to Courts. . . . . . . . . It is hereby enacted as follows; -

The Act of 1908 contained 30 Sections and 183 Articles. The sections deal with general principles applicable to extention of time to Courts. Articles 1 to 149 related to suits. Articles 150 to 157 related to appeals and Articles 158 to 183 related to applications. "

The need for reform of the law of Limitation in India was, however, still felt. The main reason according to the Third Report of the Law Com mission, was the conflict of Judicial opinions on matters governing the rights of the parties. Judicial decisions also brought to light difficulties and doubts. As the law Commissioner said:

"it cannot be gain-said that the law should be simple and certain. The time of the Courts should not be vested in disputes concerning the shadow and not the substance. As far as possible, legislation should avoid the possibility of conflict betwe