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HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
M.Katju, A.C.J., Sunil Ambwani and K.N.Ojha, JJ.
BISAULI VYAPAR MANDAL
Versus
STATE OF U P
Decided On : 07 October 2004
Civil Misc. Writ Petition 52 (Tax) Of 1986
Administrator - Municipal Tax Imposition - U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, Section 31(b) - The court discussed the interpretation of Section 31(b) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and concluded that an Administrator cannot impose a municipal tax when the Municipal Board has been dissolved or superseded.
Fact of the Case:
The court considered whether an Administrator of a Municipal Board can impose a municipal tax as per the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, when the Municipal Board has been dissolved or superseded under section 30 of the Act. The court analyzed the relevant provisions and previous decisions to reach a conclusion.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that an Administrator cannot impose a municipal tax when the Municipal Board has been dissolved or superseded, as the Administrator cannot be deemed to be the Municipal Board for all purposes, as indicated by the use of the words 'so far as may be' in Section 31(b) of the Act.
Issues: The key issue was whether an Administrator can impose a municipal tax after the dissolution or supersession of the Municipal Board under the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the interpretation of Section 31(b) of the Act and the principle that no part of a statute should be treated as redundant, concluding that an Administrator cannot be deemed to be the Municipal Board for all purposes, and therefore cannot impose a municipal tax.
Final Decision: The court allowed the writ petition and ruled that the respondents cannot demand or recover House Tax or other Municipal taxes from the petitioners as imposed by the administrator.
( 1 ) HEARD Sri S. K. Verma, learned Senior Counsel and Sri Siddhartha Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri S. M. A. Kazmi, learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State and Sri U. S. Mishra, learned Counsel for the Municipal Board, Bisauli.
( 2 ) THIS Full Bench has been constituted by order of Honble the Acting Chief Justice on a reference made by a Division Bench dated 16. 8. 2000 as the Division Bench doubted the correctness of the view of another Division Bench in Madan Lal Gupta and others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 226 (Tax) of 1983, decided on 20. 5. 1998.
( 3 ) THE short question in this case is whether an Administrator of a Municipal Board can impose a municipal Tax as envisaged by Chapter V of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) when the Municipal Board has been dissolved or superseded under section 30 of the Act.
( 4 ) THE Division Bench, which made the reference order dated 16. 8. 2000 (presided over by one of us M. Katju, J.), was of the view that an Administrator, who was appointed after dissolution or supersession of the Municipal Board can impose a municipal tax as he steps into the shoes of the municipal Board and he can do all acts which a Municipal Board does, although he is not an elected authority. In this connection reference was made to Section 31 (b) of the U. P. Municipalities Act which prior to its deletion by U. P. Act No. 12 of 1994 read as follows :
"such person or persons as the State Government may appoint in that behalf shall, so long as the supersession of the Board lasts, exercise and perform, so far as may be, the powers and duties of the Board and shall be deemed to be the Board for all purposes and the person so appointed, shall be called the Administrator, and accordingly, the provisions of Section 10-A shall mutatis mutandis apply. "
( 5 ) THE Division Bench was of the view that since Section 3 l (b) of the Act states that after supersession of the Municipal Board, the Administrator shall be the Board for all purposes, hence he can also impose a municipal tax.
( 6 ) SRI S. K. Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that we cannot ignore the words "so far as may be" in Section31 (b) of the Act. He sub- mitted that it is a well settled principle of interpretation that no part of a statute can be treated as redundant. Consequently he submitted that the Administrator cannot be treated as a Municipal Board for all purposes, otherwise the words "so far as may be" would become redundant.
( 7 ) WE accept this submission of Sri Verma. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arbinda Base, AIR 1952 sc 369 (per Patanjali Sastri J.) the Supreme Court observed:
"it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. "
( 8 ) IN Ghanshyamdas v. Regl. Asstt. Commr. , AIR 1964 SC 766, the Supreme Court observed :
"a construction which would attribute redundancy to a legislature shall not be accepted except for compelling reasons. "
( 9 ) IN Krishnayya v. Seshachalam, AIR 1965 SC 939, the Supreme Court observed :
"it is commonplace that every provision of a statute has to be given full effect and whenever possible the Court should not place that construction upon a provision which would tend to make it redundant. . . . . . "
( 10 ) IN Ballabhdas v. State of Orissa, (1976) 2 SCC 44, the Supreme Court observed :
"it is equally well settled that the legislature does not waste words or introduce useless or redundant provisions. "
( 11 ) IN Indian Chamber of Commerce v. CIT, (1976) 1 SCC 324, the Supreme Court observed :
"section 2 (xv) must be interpreted in such a manner that every word is given a meaning and not to treat any expression as redundant. "
( 12 ) IN Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, the Supreme Court observed :
"it is a cardinal rule of construction t
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