The Regional Deputy Director of Education exercises quasi-judicial powers, must consider the validity of elections in determining actual control, and is not required to recognize a committee when both rival committees' elections are invalid.

( 1 ) THIS Bench has been constituted to decide the scope of the powers of the Regional Deputy Director of education, under Section 16-A (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (in short, the Act) in deciding the disputes with regard to rival Committees of Management, claiming actual control over the affairs of the recognised and aided educational institutions.

( 2 ) IN Writ Petition No. 35267/1992, the committee of Management v. Deputy Director of Education, Gorakhpur, in the referring order dated 6-11 -1992, a learned single judge was of the opinion that the Division bench decision in Committee of Management v. Regional Deputy Director of Education, 1988 UPLBEC 402 : (1988 All LJ 1023), and the decisions which have held that the deputy Director of Education can go into the question of validity of the elections, needs to be reconsidered by a Larger Bench. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27735/1995, committee of Management v. Regional deputy Director of Education, Agra, the question with regard to the powers of the deputy Director of Education, where he does not find any of the rival committees to be validly elected, have been referred to the larger bench to decide as to whether the deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A (7) of the Act can disapprove and disregard elections of both the rival Committees of Management, and whether in that event he will be required to decide the question of effective control over the institution. 2a. Both these references were heard by a Bench of Three Judges. By an order dated 5-5-1997, they differed with the opinion of the Full Bench of this Court in Committee of Management v. Deputy Director of Education, air 1997 All 99 : (1997 All LJ 192)in which it was held that the powers of the deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A of the Act are purely administrative in nature, and his jurisdiction is only to find out as to who is in actual control of the affairs of the institution. The Full Bench held that it was not proper for the Bench of Three judges to hold to the contrary to what has been laid down by another bench of coordinate jurisdiction. They recommended to constitute a Bench of five Judges to decide the controversy, and that is how the matter has been placed before us.

( 3 ) THE Full Bench decision of this Court in Committee of Management v. Deputy Director of Education, AIR 1997 All 99 : (1997 all LJ 192), considered a reference made to it by a Division Bench in Special Appeal, quoted as under (Para 1) :

"whether the Deputy Director of Education can be said to be functioning as a Tribunal within the meaning of Rule-5 of Chapter-VIII of Allahabad High Court Rules while exercising the powers conferred on him under sub-section (7) of Section 16-A of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. "

( 4 ) THE Special Appeal had arisen from an order passed by a learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition, questioning the validity of the order passed by Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A (7)of the Act. An objection was raised that the special Appeal was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Rule 5 of Chapter-VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, as the deputy Director of Education acts as a Tribunal and no Special Appeal lies in respect of an order of a Tribunal. In para 17 of the judgment, the Full Bench held as follows :

"17. It would appear that to determine the question whether an authority is a Tribunal, the nature of the order passed by the authority and also the characteristic of the body which is called upon to adjudicate upon the matter in dispute are material considerations. Even a judicial authority may, in a given situation, act in administrative or executive capacity. In that situation the authority would not be a Tribunal. Likewise an administrative authority, even if required to act judicially would not be a Tribunal if it is not invested with the inherent judicial power of the State. As pointed out earlier under Sect