The central legal point established in the judgment is that there is presently no period of limitation for filing a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the effect of the amendments.

Prakash Krishna, J.—This is claimant’s appeal. It arises out of the claim petition filed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The court below by the impugned order dated 24.7.1991, has refused to condone the delay of seven months and eleven days in filing the claim petition.

2. The appellant filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal along with an application under Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay. It was filed on the allegation that on 26.10.1988 the applicant met with an accident at G.T. Road. His right foot was injured and he was hospitalized for treatment till 1.7.1989. After discharge from the hospital the present petition was filed on 2.9.1989. The Tribunal rejected the petition as barred by time on the short ground that the appellant did not file medical certificate in support of application for condonation of delay and, as such, was not prevented by sufficient cause for not filing the claim petition within time. The Tribunal was of the view that after discharge from Adarsh Nursing Home, on 1.7.1989, the claim petition could have been filed immediately thereafter. If the appellant was unable to come to the Court he could have got filed through some body or he could have sent the same by registered post.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4. The facts of the case are not much in dispute. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of appeal has placed reliance upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Dhanna Lal v. D. P. Vijayvargia, AIR 1996 SC 2155, and submitted that the delay should have been condoned in the facts of the present case.

5. In contra learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon judgment of this Court in Raghubir Singh v. Agra Cantonment Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd., 2004 RD 139 and submitted that the present appeal is not maintainable.

6. Before coming to the merit of appeal it is desirable to decide about the maintainability of appeal. An appeal shall lie under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against an award passed under Section 168 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that since in the present case delay in filing the claim petition was not condoned, therefore, the said order is not appealable. In support of his submission he has placed reliance upon the aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this Court. On a careful reading of the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench, it is clear that the same has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, application to set aside the decree was filed which was rejected by the Court being barred by time. The order rejecting the application for condonation of delay was the subject-matter of appeal. In that background this Court took a view that the appeal was not maintainable. However, in the present case the facts are entirely different. As a result of refusal to condone the delay claim petition stands dismissed. The refusal to grant any compensation is as to whether the award has been passed after hearing the parties or at the threshold when the claim petition was filed and has been rejected, the said order is the award passed by the Claims Tribunal and is, therefore, appealable, under Section 173 of the Act.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon Lalloo Bharti v. Anwar, 1997 (31) ALR 160, a Division Bench judgment of this Court in support of the submission that the present appeal is not maintainable. The said ruling has no application to the facts of the present case. In the case it was held by this Court that no appeal lies under Section 173 of the Act against the order rejecting the prayer made for restoration of the claim dismissed in default. This Court was considering entirely a different set of facts in the aforesaid case and, as such, said ruling is distinguishable on facts.

8. Another technical objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the memo of appeal provisi