2012 Supreme(All) 1280
[2012(7) ADJ 655 (DB)]
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
BEFORE : RAJES KUMAR AND ANIL KUMAR SHARMA, JJ.
RAMJI SINGH ....Appellant
Versus
ANUJ KUMAR SINGH ....Respondent
(First Appeal From Order Defective No. 673 of 2012, decided on 11th May, 2012)
Counsel :
Sankatha Rai, Dr. Vinod Kumar Rai and Vijay Kumar Rai for the Appellant.
Headnote:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Order XXXIX, Rules 3-A and 4—Ex parte ad interim injunction—Setting aside of—Objection filed under Rule 4, Order XXXIX CPC—Maintainability of appeal—When the appellant had already filed objections as required under Rule 4 and the trial Court concluded hearing, the instant appeal, would not be entertained—No interference in the impugned order required. [Paras 7, 8 and 9]
Result; Appeal Dismissed.
Hon’ble Anil Kumar Sharma, J.—The defendant of O.S. No. 170 of 2012 Anuj Kumar Singh v. Ram Ji Singh, pending in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Ballia has approached this Court by way of instant appeal for setting aside ex parte ad interim injunction order passed by the learned trial Court on 28.2.2012.
The Stamp Reporter of the Court has noted that the instant first appeal from order is not maintainable.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length and perused the impugned order and other papers filed alongwith memo of appeal as well as the law cited at the Bar.
3. The plaintiff-respondent has filed suit (O. S. No. 170/12) in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr.Div.), Ballia for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from carrying on business of brick-klin in the year 2012 without paying his share in profits amounting to Rs. 10.5 lakhs for the year-2011, from selling 2.5 lakhs baked bricks and 4.0 lakhs raw bricks; from using 15 tons coal lying at the brick klin and interfering in plaintiff’s egress and ingress in the brick-klin bounded at the foot of the plaint. The plaintiff relied upon an unregistered partnership-deed dated 15.1.2011 executed between him and the defendant for running brick-klin in the name and style of ‘M/s Yuva Shakti Eint Bhatta’, and its registration certificate with the Commercial Tax Department. Ballia. Alongwith the suit the plaintiff filed application for ad interim injunction 6-C/2 supported with affidavit. The learned trial Court after hearing plaintiff’s counsel through impugned order dated 28.2.2012 granted interim relief restraining the defendant from running the brick-klin in the year 2012 without paying Rs. 10.5 lakhs to the plaintiff and further restrained him from selling the baked and raw bricks, using 15 tons coal and from plaintiff’s visit in the brick-klin bounded at the foot of the plaint.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has not followed the mandate of Rule 3 and 3-A of Order XXXIX Code of Civil Procedure in as much as no reasons have been recorded in the impugned order, so it is bad in law and since the application for ad interim injunction application has not been disposed of within 30 days, the ex parte ad interim injunction order has become final, so the instant appeal is maintainable. He has placed reliance on the following cases:
1. A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and others, (2000) 7 SCC 695;
2. Ashok Prakashan (Regd.) and another v. Sunil Kumar and others, 2006(6) ADJ 1;
3. American Institute of English Language Pvt. Ltd. v. Nitin Saraswat and another, 2003 (1) ARC 35;
4. Laxmi Narain and another v. The District Judge, Lalitpur and another, 1999 (36) ALR 198;
5. Road Flying Carrier and another v. The General Electric Company of India Ltd., AIR 1990 All 134; and
6. Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, JT 1993 (3) SC 238.
5. In the facts of the case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) the trial Court has granted ex parte ad interim injunction straight away for two months violating the provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 39 of the Code, which provides that where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted and where it is unable to do so, it shall record its reasons for such inability. The defendants challenged this order before High Court by way of revision under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned single Judge setting aside the order observed that the trial Court ought not have granted an order of injunction at the first stage itself which could operate beyond thirty days as the Court had then no occasion to know of what the affected party has to say about it. Such a course is impermissible under Order 39 Rule 3-A of the Code. On these facts, the Apex Court in para-21 of the report obser