Judgment :- This is a decree-holders appeal and it raises only a Question of limitation.

2. The suit in which the decree was passed had been filed in the Court of the City Munsif Azamgarh. It was then transferred to the Additional Munsif who later became Munsif Haveli, Azamgarh. As Munsif Haveli he passed the decree in question on 28-8-1942. The decree was affirmed in appeal on 3-6-1943.

3. On 23-10-1945, the decree-holders made their first application for execution in the Court of the City Munsif, Azamgarh, instead of in the Court which had passed the decree, namely that of the Munsif Haveli, Azamgarh. The judgment-debtor objected to this application on several grounds, though not on the ground that the Munsif City Azamgarh had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. On 12-12-1945 the said application for execution was dismissed for default.

4. On 13-2-1946 the decree-holders made their second application for execution again in the Court of the City Munsif Azamgarh. Then also objections were taken by the judgment-debtor, and inter alia it was pleaded that this learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to execute the decree which had been passed by the Munsif Haveli. The learned City Munsif allowed this objection and returned the application for presentation to the proper Court on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with it. The same day, 20-7-1946, the aforesaid second application for execution was presented by the decree-holders to the Munsif Haveli with a prayer inserted in the application that a certificate of transfer of the execution Case to the City Munsif might be issued, as the judgment-debtors property against which the decree-holder wanted to proceed lay only within the jurisdiction of that Munsif.

There was also a separate application made by the decree-holders to that effect. The judgment-debtor objected to this request for a transfer-certificate on the ground that the application for execution, taking it to be the application of 20-7-1946 presented to the Court of the Munsif Haveli, was barred by time. The decree-holders met the objection by invoking S.14, Limitation Act. The question, therefore, was whether under this section the decree-holders were entitled to exclude the period between 23-10-1945, when they made their first application for execution to the Court of the City Munsif and 20-7-1946, when they subsequently presented their second application for execution in the Court of Munsif Haveli.

5. The execution Court, answering the above question in the affirmative and holding that the decree-holders were entitled to exclude the above period, held that the application for execution was within time, and it ordered the execution to proceed. The lower appellate Court reversed this order and dismissed the application as time-barred. Section 14, Limitation Act, according to that Court, did not apply mainly because Mr. Bishnath Singh, the lawyer through whom the decree-holders had filed all the applications, should have known that a decree passed by the Munsif Haveli could not be executed by the City Munsif and that there was no good faith or due diligence on the part of the decree-holders in filing their application for execution each time in the Court of the City Munsif. Another ground on which this section was held inapplicable was that the relief in the application made to the Munsif Haveli on 20-7-1946 was not the same as that in the application for execution.

6. Learned counsel for the decree-holders has challenged the findings of the lower appellate Court as erroneous. In anticipation of an argument to that effect by the judgment-debtor he contended that the finding against the decree-holders good faith within the meaning of S.14, Limitation Act, though apparently one of fact, should not be upheld by this Court. The learned Civil Judge, relying on the definition of good faith in S.2(7), Limitation Act, that "nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention" and

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