Back
1987 Supreme(All) 559
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
V.K. MEHROTRA, A.N. VARMA, JJ.
D. K. Agarwal - Appellant
Versus
High Court Of Allahabad Through The Registrar - Respondent
Civil Misc. Writ No. 4434 of 1987
Decided on : Dec 10, 1987
Advocate appeared:
Ravi Kant
The Full Court has the discretion to consider the case of an officer for appointment to a post in the super-time scale on the basis of merit as envisaged by Rules 27 and 27-A of the Higher Judicial Service Rules.
Headnote:
FULL COURT - ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION - HIGHER JUDICIAL SERVICE - APPOINTMENT TO SUPER-TIME SCALE POST - GRANT OF - COURT'S DISCRETION - RE-CONSIDERATION OF MATERIAL - PERMISSIBILITY - BIAS - PRESENCE OF JUDGE IN FULL COURT MEETING - ALLEGATION OF - EFFECT - CIRCUMSTANCES NOT AMOUNTING TO BIAS - DECISION NOT VITIATED - SPEAKING ORDER - REQUIREMENT OF - REASONS FOR DENIAL OF SUPER-TIME SCALE - NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION - GIVING OF REASONS NOT MANDATORY - MERIT - CONCEPT OF - RE-CONSIDERATION OF SAME MATERIAL - PERMISSIBILITY - PROMOTION - CONCEPT OF - AUTOMATIC PROMOTION RULED OUT - COURT ENTITLED TO CONSIDER MATERIAL RELATING TO PERIOD SUBSEQUENT TO ELIGIBILITY - DECISION NOT VITIATED - QUASHING OF DECISION - GROUNDS FOR - OPPORTUNITY OF EXPLANATION NOT GIVEN TO OFFICER - FULL COURT'S DECISION QUASHED - DIRECTION FOR RE-CONSIDERATION - PROPRIETY - COURT NOT TO SIT IN APPEAL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION - DECLARATION OF FITNESS OR APPOINTMENT TO SUPER-TIME SCALE POST - NOT PERMISSIBLE.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner, a District Judge, was considered for grant of Selection Grade and was recommended for it by a Committee of three Hon'ble Judges. The recommendation was accepted in a meeting of the Full Court. Petitioner was due for grant of super-time scale on a certain date. However, in a meeting of the Full Court, he was found not fit for grant of super-time scale. Petitioner challenged this decision in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Finding of the Court:
1. The Full Court has the discretion to consider the case of an officer for appointment to a post in the super-time scale on the basis of merit as envisaged by Rules 27 and 27-A of the Higher Judicial Service Rules. 2. The Court can re-consider the same material while deciding about the grant or otherwise of super-time scale. 3. The presence of a Judge in a Full Court meeting, who had made certain allegations against the petitioner, does not amount to bias and does not vitiate the decision taken in the meeting. 4. The decision of the Court denying super-time scale to the petitioner is not a quasi-judicial function and, therefore, giving of reasons for the decision is not mandatory. 5. The concept of merit for a post in the lower grade or scale is bound to be different from that in higher grade or scale. No objective standard has been prescribed for judging the merit of an officer when considering his case for appointment to a post in the lower or higher grade. 6. There is no bar to the Court looking into the work and conduct of an officer afresh, when deciding whether he was entitled to be selected for a post in the super-time scale, again for the same period for which it had looked into the work and conduct of the officer for a decision whether he is entitled to be posted on a post in selection grade. 7. The Court is entitled to take into account all the material and facts in regard to an officer which comes to its notice at the time when the case of the officer is being considered even though it may relate to the period subsequent to the date when the officer has become eligible for consideration under the Rules.
Issues: 1. Whether the Full Court has the discretion to consider the case of an officer for appointment to a post in the super-time scale on the basis of merit as envisaged by Rules 27 and 27-A of the Higher Judicial Service Rules? 2. Whether the Court can re-consider the same material while deciding about the grant or otherwise of super-time scale? 3. Whether the presence of a Judge in a Full Court meeting, who had made certain allegations against the petitioner, amounts to bias and vitiates the decision taken in the meeting? 4. Whether the decision of the Court denying super-time scale to the petitioner is a quasi-judicial function and, therefore, giving of reasons for the decision is mandatory? 5. Whether the concept of merit for a post in the lower grade or scale is bound to be different from that in higher grade or scale? 6. Whether there is any bar to the Court looking into the work and conduct of an officer afresh, when deciding whether he was entitled to be selected for a post in the super-time scale, again for the same period for which it had looked into the work and conduct of the officer for a decision whether he is entitled to be posted on a post in selection grade? 7. Whether the Court is entitled to take into account all the material and facts in regard to an officer which comes to its notice at the time when the case of the officer is being considered even though it may relate to the period subsequent to the date when the officer has become eligible for consideration under the Rules?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Full Court has the discretion to consider the case of an officer for appointment to a post in the super-time scale on the basis of merit as envisaged by Rules 27 and 27-A of the Higher Judicial Service Rules. 2. The Court can re-consider the same material while deciding about the grant or otherwise of super-time scale. 3. The presence of a Judge in a Full Court meeting, who had made certain allegations against the petitioner, does not amount to bias and does not vitiate the decision taken in the meeting. 4. The decision of the Court denying super-time scale to the petitioner is not a quasi-judicial function and, therefore, giving of reasons for the decision is not mandatory. 5. The concept of merit for a post in the lower grade or scale is bound to be different from that in higher grade or scale. No objective standard has been prescribed for judging the merit of an officer when considering his case for appointment to a post in the lower or higher grade. 6. There is no bar to the Court looking into the work and conduct of an officer afresh, when deciding whether he was entitled to be selected for a post in the super-time scale, again for the same period for which it had looked into the work and conduct of the officer for a decision whether he is entitled to be posted on a post in selection grade. 7. The Court is entitled to take into account all the material and facts in regard to an officer which comes to its notice at the time when the case of the officer is being considered even though it may relate to the period subsequent to the date when the officer has become eligible for consideration under the Rules.
Final Decision: The writ petition was allowed to the extent that the decision of the Full Court denying super-time scale to the petitioner was quashed and the Court was directed to re-consider the petitioner's case for appointment to a post in the super-time scale at a very early date.
V. K. Mehrotra, J.
1. Sri D. K. Agarwal was inducted in the U. P. Nyayik Sewa as a Munsif in the year 1957. He was confirmed, after his first posting on February 25, 1959 as a Munsif, on February 25, 1961. In January, 1968 he was posted as a Civil Judge and was confirmed as such in Marsh, 1974. In this State, like many others, there is a Higher Judicial Service. It is governed by the U. P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975 (briefly, the Rules). D. K. Agarwal was promoted to this service on October 13, 1971. He was selected for this service on the criterion contained in rule 20 (3) namely, seniority-cum-merit. On April 20, 1977 he was confirmed in this Service. He was appointed as a District Judge on October 31, 1983.
2. Some posts in the Higher Judicial Service are to be filled in by officers in the Selection Grade. Rule 27 regulates the grant of Selection Grade. It says :-
"27. Appointment to the Selection Grade-Appointment to the Selection Grade posts in the service shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the court from amongst the members of the service holding the post of District and Sessions Judge on the basis of merit ".
The Service also has some posts in the super-time scale in respect whereof rule 27-A was added to the Rules in the year 1984. It says :
"27-A. Appointment to the supertime scale posts in the Service shall be made by the Court from amongst the members of the Service holding Selection Grade posts on the basis of merit ".
3. D. K. Agarwal was considered for grant of Seiection Grade. He was recommended for it by a Committee of three Hon'ble Judges. The recommendation was accepted in a meeting of the Full Court held on January 25, 1986. According to his case, D. K. Agarwal became due for grant of a supertime scale on August 1, 1986. However, in a meeting of the Full Court held on January 17, 1987 he was found not fit for grant of supertime scale. It is this decision which has been assailed by D. K. Agar,\al in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was presented before the court on March 9, 1987. The respondents were called upon to place their version in the form of a counter affidavit before the admission of the writ petition. They have done so. A supplementary counter affidavit has also been filed in reply to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner by which he purported to place the events, that took place subsequent to the presentation of the writ petition, on the record. After filing of the rejoinder affidavit, counsel for the parties prayed that the petition be heard finally and disposed of at the admission stage itself. We heard them at some length and proceed to decide it finally.
4. The petitioner says that, along with the other eligible officers for grant of supertime scale, his case was also considered by the Selection Committee consisting of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court and the Committee, after thoroughly scrutinising his service record and being satisfied that he was possessed of necessary merit, recommended his name for the grant of supertime scale. The recommendations were placed before a meeting of the Full Court on May 17, 1986. In this meeting one of the Hon'ble Judges (Hon, Mr. Justice K. N. Misra) complained orally against the petitioner in respect of his alleged involvement in some smuggling activity in June, 1985 at which the matter was deferred for consideration to a subsequent meeting. The case of the petitioner is that in May, 1986 some inquiry was conducted by Justice K. N. Misra behind the back of the petitioner through the District Judge, Gonda on the basis whereof he made the allegations against the petitioner in the Full Court meeting of May 17, 1986. The District Judge is said to have written to the District Magistrate, Gonda inquiring about the involvement of the petitioner in smuggling activities who, after making inquiry into the matter, found the accusation as malicious and baseless and wrote to the District Judg
