The substance of an instrument, not its title, is crucial in determining the nature of the relationship it creates. Additionally, the entitlement to occupy premises in one's own right is a key factor in determining the maintainability of a release application.

This is a petition by one of the alleged tenants of a shop arising from proceeding for its release which have been allowed by both the courts below.

Brief Facts and History:

2. The house situate at Subhash Road, Aligarh, the property of three brothers Chatur Mohan Mathur, Pyare Mohan Mathur and Jitendra Mohan Mathur, all sons of late Lalit Mohan Mathur had fallen down. The aforesaid owners leased out the aforesaid property except part of it which comprised of a house bearing Municipal Number 7/236, in favour of Bishan Dayal and Harish Chandra Gandhi for a period of 10 years vide lease deed dated 30.6.1982 @ Rs. 1,800/- per month. In the said lease, the lessors together were described as first party, one of the lessees Bishan Dayal as the second party and the other lessee Harish Chandra Gandhi as the third party. The lease stipulates that the lessees ie., second and third party shall raise constructions on the ground floor according to map annexed at their own cost and expenses and for that purpose they may utilize the debris of the old fallen house. The lessees shall not assign their rights and shall not mortgage, sell or transfer any part or whole of the demised premises in any manner detrimental to the interest of the lessors but they may permit any person to occupy one of shops each constructed by them over the demised premises as licensee. However, such persons shall not be deemed to be tenants or lessees of the lessors. The lease also envisages that on the expiry of 10 years the lessees by giving 15 days notice in writing may continue with the lease for a further period of 10 years on enhancement of existing rent by 10%.

3. In pursuance to the aforesaid lease deed, Harish Chandra Gandhi, one of the lessees entered into possession of the demised premises and constructed two shops which are more precisely described as shops no. 2 and 3. He allowed one of the aforesaid shop no. 2 to be occupied by Rakesh Gupta and Sri Mamta Gupta vide license dated 27.3.1985 allegedly in terms of the aforesaid lease deed for a period of 10 years with retrospective effect from 18.11.1982 @ Rs. 800/- per month.

The aforesaid arrangement amongst the parties continued even after expiry of initial period of 10 years.

4. On 22.7.1999, during the continuation of the above arrangement, Harish Chandra Gandhi respondent no. 1 applied under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972(hereinafter for short 'Act') for release of the aforesaid shop for the bonafide need of his son Gaurav as against petitioner Rakesh Gupta and respondent no. 2 Smt. Mamta Gupta alleging himself to be the landlord of the shop and the aforesaid Rakesh Gupta and Smt. Mamta Gupta as the tenants.

The release was contested by the petitioner Rakesh Gupta as well as respondent no. 2 Smt. Mamta Gupta by filing a written statement.

5. The release application was allowed by the prescribed authority vide judgment and order 5.4.2002 and the appeal of the petitioner against the same was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 3.2.2005.

It is against the aforesaid two judgments and orders allowing the release application of the respondent no. 1 under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act that the petitioner alone has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India arraying Smt. Mamta Gupta as respondent no. 2.

6. One of the owners of the demised premises Jitendra Mohan Mathur applied for his impleadment as one of the respondents. His counsel, Sri Bharat Singh, was given audience without any formal order of impleadment treating him to be the representative of the owners of the property even though he was not a necessary party to the proceedings as he was not even party to the proceedings in the courts below and no relief was claimed against him in the release application. He had nothing material to say except that he was supporting the case of the petitioner and that he had drawn separate proceedings for eviction of respondent no. 1 from the