The central legal point established in the judgment is the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide a suit filed by a workman against his termination order and the interpretation of relevant regulations.

Heard Sri Satya Prakash, learned counsel for the appellant. No one appeared on behalf of respondents even though the case was taken up in the revised list.

Orders passed on 22.12.2011 and 18.5.2012 on the order sheet are quoted below:

"22.12.2011

This Second Appeal was earlier allowed on 15.2.2010 without framing any substantial questions of law. The said judgment has been set aside on 18.4.2011 by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3331 of 2011 only on the ground that appeal had been allowed without framing substantial question of law.

Accordingly it is directed that the appeal shall be heard on the following substantial question of law:-

1.Whether Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide the suit filed by a workman against his termination order regarding which he could also raise an industrial dispute under Industrial Disputes Act?

List for hearing on 10.1.2012."

"18.5.2012

This appeal was initially allowed without framing any substantial question of law. Thereafter Supreme Court after setting aside the said judgment of this court remanded the matter for deciding the appeal after framing substantial question of law. On 22.12.2011 I framed the following substantial question of law:

Whether Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide the suit filed by a workman against his termination order regarding which he could also raise an industrial dispute under Industrial Disputes Act?

Thereafter on 17.1.2012 arguments of learned counsel for the appellant were heard. No one had appeared on behalf of the respondent on the said date. Judgment was reserved.

However, while preparing the judgment it transpired that some more substantial questions of law were also involved. Accordingly, the following substantial questions of law are also framed:

2. Whether original plaintiff was workman as defined by Industrial Disputes Act?

3. Whether original plaintiff had been confirmed/deemed conformed on his post?

4. Whether Regulation 19 of Food Corporation of India Staff Regulations 1971 has rightly been interpreted by the courts below?

5. Whether Regulation 19 of Food Corporation of India Staff Regulations 1971 was applicable to the original plaintiff regard being had to his nature status of employment at the time of its termination?

6. Whether Regulation 19 of Food Corporation of India Staff Regulations 1971 is constitutionally valid or is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India?

7. What relief if any, can be granted to the Legal Representatives of original plaintiff who has died and substituted by Legal Representatives?

List for further hearing in the second week of July, 2012."

This second appeal arises out of O.S. no.644 of 1974 instituted by J.S. Sirohi, original respondent in the Second appeal (since deceased and survived by legal representatives against Food Corporation of India, appellant in this appeal. The relief claimed in the suit was for declaration that termination of plaintiff who was an employee of Food Corporation of India was null and void. Relief of mandatory injunction directing the appellant to pay salary with increment to the plaintiff was also sought.

Plaintiff was appointed as Assistant Grade-III in the year 1972. He was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade 2(M) in 1973. However, on 7.11.1973 he was reverted back and on 27.12.1973 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by serving a charge sheet. However, without completion of domestic inquiry services were terminated on 23.1.1974 and the termination order was upheld in departmental appeal.

The case of the plaintiff was that services had wrongly been terminated without opportunity of hearing.

The case of the defendant appellant was that termination was not on the basis of misconduct or pursuant to finding of guilt in departmental proceedings but it was in accordance with the regulation 19 of the relevant regulations which provided for termination of services of an employee by giving him 90 days notice or pay in lieu thereof.

Trial court/