JUDGMENT

B. P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. :—Leave granted in all Special Leave Petitions.

2. The respondents in these appeals are the employees of the appellant-Corporation, viz., Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. Pursuant to disciplinary enquires held against them on charges of misconduct, their services were terminated. They filed civil suits for a declaration that the order terminating their services is illegal and invalid and for a further declaration that they must be deemed to have continued and are still continuing in the service of the Corporation with all consequential benefits. The Corporation resisted the suits on the ground inter alia that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The Trial Court decreed the suits as prayed for. Appeals as also Second Appeals preferred by the Corporation were dismissed by the learned District Judge and High Court.

3. When these appeals came up for hearing before a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court, the appellant-Corporation relied upon the principles enunciated in Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the judgment in Premier Automobiles Limited v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay (1976) 1 SCC 496 and in particular upon the decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. (1989)3 SCC 582. The Bench was of the opinion, agreeing with the decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas, that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suits but in view of the order dated October 18, 1989 in S.L.P.(C) No. 9386 of 1988 (rendered by two-Judge Bench of this Court) holding a civil suit concerning a similar dispute to be maintainable, the Bench thought it appropriate that the appeals are heard by a Bench of three Judges. It is pursuant to their order dated September 23, 1993 that these appeals have been placed before this Bench.

4. The appellant-Corporation has been constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It is a statutory Corporation. Though Section 45 of the said Act empowers the Corporation to frame regulations prescribing the conditions of service of its employees, not such regulations have been framed insofar as the employees answering the description of "workman" as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are concerned. They are governed by the certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. These Standing Orders inter alia define "misconduct" and prescribe the procedure for conducting the disciplinary proceedings against such employees.

5. The Corporation says that the disciplinary enquiries, which resulted in the dismissal of the respondents were conducted perfectly in accordance with the Standing Orders, whereas the case of the respondents/plaintiffs is that they were conducted in violation of the Standing Orders. The precise question in these appeals is whether a suit of this nature is maintainable in a Civil Court. The Corporation says that it is not. According to them the respondents only remedy was to approach the Labour Court for the reliefs sought for by them in the suit.

6. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that "the Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." The question is whether by virtue of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act read with the Standing Orders aforesaid, the Civil Courts jurisdiction to take cognizance of such suits is barred? This question calls for a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as well as the Standing Orders Act, 1946.

The Industrial Disputes Act (the Act) was enacted to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill (which became the Act) stated inter alia. "(T) he bill also s