Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This appeal has been preferred under Section 54 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1894”) assailing the judgment and decree dated 8.3.1995 passed by District Judge, Bulandshahar in Land Acquisition Reference No. 190 of 1987. It has been filed with delay of 312 days and hence this application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1963”) seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The explanation is general correspondence for permission. It is however, stated that the judgment was delivered on 8.3.1995 but certified copy was applied on 5.4.1995, i.e. after almost a month. The certified copy was ready on 4.5.1995 and received by District Government Counsel on the same day. The intimation was also given to applicant-appellant’s office on the same day, i.e., 4.5.1995, but thereafter a letter was sent to State Government on 30.6.1995 seeking instructions. Reminders were also sent and the contest order was issued by State Government on 25.8.1995 but still this appeal has been preferred on 28.7.1996. Therefore, there is virtually no explanation for the last eleven months when State Government accorded the permission to file the appeal.

2. Having gone through the above explanation, I find the same to be totally sketchy and superficial and, in my view, there is virtually no explanation as to why the matter was not taken up with due earnest and reasonable expediency.

3. It is true that when State is a party, and file appeal with some delay, it may deserve some leverage for official hierarchical steps for permission etc. but a wholly unexplained, reckless and negligent approach of delay cannot be overlooked particularly when it is not the case of applicants that they have taken any action against erring individual.

4. The expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107, the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

5. In the matters where action is brought by Government, no person is individually affected and in ultimate analysis it is the public interest which suffers. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional and do not share the characteristic of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation though is equal and apply at par to both private individual and Government but where the Government makes out a case of sufferings to public interest owing to acts of fraud and bad faith on the part of its officials and agents, and also, the intention of Government not to allow such officers of doubtful integrity to go scot free, the Court should also come forward to do justice in the interest of public at large, but, a mere eye wash kind of explanation, without any honest intention of State authorities to proceed against tainted officers, or, those who have acted in a bad faith, or, those who have worked negligently, the explanation that delay must be condoned in public interest would be superficial and lacking bona fide, hence difficult to be accepted by Court.

6. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897, in para 8 of the judgment, the Court said:

“8. . . . . . . . Therefore, in assessing what, in a p