Hon’ble Mrs. Sunita Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. The present writ petition arises out of an order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

3. Before dealing with the merits of the case, the question arose as to whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable against the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal keeping in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2548 of 2009 Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, wherein it has been held that the judicial orders of Civil Court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4. Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner referring to judgment of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam (supra) submits that a distinction has been carved out between the Civil Court and a Tribunal. Mere reading of paragraph 10,11 and 21 of the said pronouncement makes it clear that the orders of Civil Court stand on a different footing from the orders of a Tribunal.

5. With reference to the provision of Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a statutory Tribunal established by the State Government. By notification of the State Government the area of jurisdiction is specified for the purpose of adjudication of claims under the Act. Section 168 provides the manner in which the Claim Tribunal has to proceed to decide the application for compensation filed under Section 166 of the Act. The procedure prescribed therein is a summary procedure.

6. Section 169 deals with the powers and procedures of the Claim Tribunal, a reading of which shows that the powers of a Civil Court are available to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to a limited extent. The Claim Tribunals shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 of the Act i.e. for the purpose of an enquiry, to impose a fine upon a person convicted for an offence under this Act. Otherwise, it has powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of :

(1) Taking the evidence of

(2) Enforcing attendance of witnesses

(3) Compelling to produce documents

(4) Material object and for such other purposes as may be prescribed.

7. Rule 221 of the Motor Vehicles Rules provides that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 will apply only in certain cases. Rule 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rule 2 to 21 of Order XVI, Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII of the CPC would be applicable in a Civil proceeding before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

8. A Full bench of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Janki Devi and others, AIR 1982 All 296, has held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court but is a Statutory Tribunal, the incidents of which are governed entirely by the provisions of the Act.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and a careful reading of judgment of Apex Court in “Radhey Shyam” would show that the referred question in “Radhey Shyam” before the Apex Court was as to whether the view taken in Surya Devi Rai v. Ram Chandra, 2003(6) SCC 625, that the writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies against the order of Civil Court is the correct view or not. The question before the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam arose out of a proceeding in an Original Suit pending before the Civil Court. Assailing the interim injunction of the Civil Court in the pending suit, the writ petition was filed before the High Court and the interim injunction granted by the Civil Court was vacated. Hence the aggrieved party moved to the Apex Court by filing a Special Leave Petition. The contention was that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable against the order of Civil Court.

10. Considering the earlier nine judges bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of M