( 1 ) THE following question has been referred to this Bench for decision.

"whether a cross-objection as contemplated by Order XLI, Rule 22 of the C. P. C. is maintainable before the High Court at the instance of respondent to an appeal filed under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ?

( 2 ) A bus owned by the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation met with an accident at Malviya bridge on 13-12-1973. As a result of the incident Paras Nath Gupta an employee of the State bank of India, Varanasi, received injuries which proved fatal. The heirs of the deceased made an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under Section 110-D of the Motor vehicles Act claiming Rs. 2,50,000/- as compensation. The Claims Tribunal by its order dated 21-1-1976 awarded a sum of Rs. 95,942/- as compensation to the claimants. Aggrieved by the award of the Claims Tribunal the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation preferred the above noted appeal to this Court. The claimants did not appeal against the award but filed a cross-objection in the appeal filed by the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation claiming the balance amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- and also interest on the amount claimed as compensation. When the appeal and the cross-objection came Up for hearing before a Division Bench of this court the Bench felt doubt about the correctness of the view taken in Virendra Singh v. Smt. Phoolmati (1978 All LR 862) and Surjan Singh v. Smt. Sharda Devi (1979 All LJ 316) that cross-obiection to an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal is not maintainable.

( 3 ) SECTION 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act confers on a person aggrieved by an award of a claims Tribunals right to prefer an appeal to the High Court within ninety days from the date of the award. The Act does not lay down the procedure to be followed by the High Court in the appeals filed before it. In such a contingency the special Act being silent in regard to the procedure by the appellate court, the appellate jurisdiction has to be exercised in the same manner as the High Court exercises its general appellate jurisdiction and the appeal so filed must be regulated by the practice and procedure of the High Court. It is a well settled rule that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. Viscount Haldane L. C. in National telephone Company Limited and His Majestys Postmaster General (1913 AC 546) stated this rule in the following words. "when a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches. In Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (AIR 1916 PC 21) a similar question arose for consideration, Section 10 of the Madras Forest Act (V of 1882) provided for an appeal to the District Court against the order of the Forest Settlement Officer. Against the decision of the District Court the matter was taken up in appeals to the Madras High Court which reversed and varied the decree of the District Court. In appeals filed before the Privy Council it was contended that the appeals before the Madras High Court were in component as there was no provision for further appeals against the decision of the District Court. The Privy Council overruled the objection and held that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the Country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil P. C. apply. The Privy Council approved the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Kamaraju v. Secretary of State, ( (1888) ILR 11 Mad 309 ). The same view was reiterated in Ba Thaw Moung v. Ma Pin (AIR 1934 PC 81) where the question was whether an appeal