Order on Delay Condonation Application

By the Court.—Heard learned Standing Counsel for the applicants-appellants and perused the record.

2. This is an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal which is reported to have been filed with a delay of 337 days. The appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 9.11.1995 passed by District Judge, Bulandshahar in Land Acquisition Reference No. 415 of 1991.

3. Delay has been sought to be explained in the affidavit accompanying this application by stating that the certified copy of the judgment was made available on 5.1.1996 and the opinion of D.G.C. (Civil) was received on 6.2.1996. The reference was made to Executive Engineer with regard to proposal of filing appeal and permission was received on 26.4.1996. On 14.8.1996 the matter was referred by Special Land Acquisition Officer to Statement Government and permission from Government was granted vide letter dated 7.10.1996. However, the appeal has been filed in February, 1997, i.e., after about four months from the date of permission, without giving explanation therefor. The entire explanation apparently is perfunctory, shallow and shows sheer recklessness on the part of authorities concerned. It appears that they were under an impression that with whatever delay they may file appeal the Court should condone the same as a matter of right even if they have not been careful enough in prosecuting the case.

4. It is true that when State is a party, and file appeal with some delay, it may deserve some leverage for official hierarchical steps for permission etc. but a wholly unexplained, reckless and negligent approach of delay cannot be overlooked particularly when it is not the case of applicants that they have taken any action against erring individual.

5. The expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107, the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

6. In the matters where action is brought by Government, no person is individually affected and in ultimate analysis it is the public interest which suffers. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional and do not share the characteristic of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation though is equal and apply at par to both private individual and Government but where the Government makes out a case of sufferings to public interest owing to acts of fraud and bad faith on the part of its officials and agents, and also, the intention of Government not to allow such officers of doubtful integrity to go scot free, the Court should also come forward to do justice in the interest of public at large, but, a mere eye wash kind of explanation, without any honest intention of State authorities to proceed against tainted officers, or, those who have acted in a bad faith, or, those who have worked negligently, the explanation that delay must be condoned in public interest would be superficial and lacking bona fide, hence difficult to be accepted by Court.

7. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897, in para 8 of the judgment, the Court said:

“8. . . . . . . . Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes ‘suff