79. But as a litigative pursuit has it hazards, the settlement by sacrificing a right to continue in employment in the hope of retaining another ended up in the loss of both. This is the story of the appellant’s hopes ending in a unexpected demise due to the strategy of the management.

80. The compromise could not have been made a ruse by the management to get rid of the appellant of all his valid claim that was not allowed to be adjudicated in either of the three writ petitions.

81. The management cannot be permitted to resile back from a compromise as has been indicated in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dhyan Singh and another v. Judgal Kishore and another, AIR 1952 SC 145, while discussing the doctrine of estoppel that has been followed by a learned Single Judge in the case of Smt.Manraji v. Deputy Director Consolidation, 2005(1) AWC 704, paragraph No. 9 extracted hereinunder:

“There is another aspect of the matter. The parties to a compromise are bound by estoppel as well. The principle of estoppel prevents the parties to resile from the compromise or to revoke it after having taken advantage of the same. This principle has been approved by the Apex Court in number of decisions. In Dhiyan Singh and another v. Jugal Kishore and another, AIR 1952 SC 145. While discussing the Doctrine of Estoppel, the Apex Court ruled that even if an award made is invalid, the persons who were parties to it are estopped from challenging the validity of the award or from going behind the award in a subsequent litigation.”

82. It is now that the flip side of the coin has to be seen. It is not the case of the appellant that he was coerced to enter into a compromise. This is evident from the affidavit dated 17.9.1985. The appellant and the Committee of Management entered into the compromise with a common denominator of getting rid of each other but with a rider that intended a better future prospect in favour of the appellant that was ultimately ruined. The presumption therefore is that the compromise and settlement was entered into between the management and the appellant without the State and its Educational Authorities being a party to the same. To study the aspect from the point of view of the management, the appellant had been discharged from service during probation. It is quite possible that the appellant had thought that his claim against such discharge may have been doubtful and therefore as noted above and admitted by the Deputy Director Education in the affidavit filed in the year 1982 petition, the appellant had filed an appeal that was transmitted to Basic Education Board on 15.6.1982. The appellant therefore had raised a challenge to his discharge order which is admitted to the State Authorities but was however denied by the management by stating that a copy of the memorandum of appeal has not been filed and even otherwise it could not be decided as the matter was subjudice before this Court.

83. The appellant therefore appears to have in the aforesaid background entered into the settlement the result whereof was that the orders passed against the management and challenged in the 1982 writ petition were not adjudicated upon as the cause for the management became infructuous due to the settlement. Simultaneously the appellant also lost his opportunity to further pursue his claim as against the post of Head Master of the institution as he got a better prospect of getting his claim considered against the post of Sub-District Inspector of Schools. Thus the appellant did promise to forego his claim on the post of Head Master so as to get another post and the parties virtually clarified their position under the compromise. This compromise was an agreement not to do something that was wrong or impermissible. At the same time the State was not a party to the compromise but was a party to the dismissal of the writ petition as infructuous.

84. The claim of the appellant therefore as against the post of Head Master became doubtf

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