Judgment

Bose, J. - This is a litigation between two branches of a family whose common ancestor was one Megh Raj Singh. The family tree is as follows :

2. The dispute is about property which, according to the plaintiffs formed part of Shanker Lals estate. The plaintiffs state that the two branches of, the family were separate at all material times; that on Shankar Lal s death in 1884 his daughter Mst. Mohan Dai (the defendants grandmother) succeeded to a limited estate. The reversion opened out on her death in October 1929 and the plaintiffs are entitled as the next reversioners, for Mst. Mohan Dei s son Shri Kishan Das predeceased her.

3. The defendants admit that Shankar Lal was separate from the other branch of the family. They divide the property which their grand mother Mst. Mohan Dai possessed into two categories. First there was property which they say belonged to her. These are properties which, according to them, she purchased or obtained under mortgages in her own right. Next, there were properness which belonged exclusively to her father and to which she succeeded as daughter. On Shankar Lal s death disputes arose between Shankar Lal s father s brother s son Brijlal (the plaintiffs grand father) and the defendants grandmother Mst. Mohan Dei. Brijlal claimed the entire estate by survivorship, his allegation being that Shanker Lal died in a state of jointness with him and that all the properties were joint family properties.

This dispute was referred to arbitration and an award was delivered. Under it Mst. Mohan Dei was given the suit properties as absolute owner and the rest of the estate then in dispute was given to Brijlal. A division was effected accordingly and ever since that is to say, from 21-12-1884, the date of the award down to 26-3-1941, the date of the suit, each branch has been in separate and uninterrupted possession of the properties respectively allotted to it and each has been dealing with them as absolute owner. The defendants claim that the plaintiffs are bound by this award and are in any event estopped.

4. The plaintiffs lost in the first Court but won in the High Court. The defendants appeal.

5. The first question is about the nature of the award. The defendants say that it gave Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute estate. The plaintiffs deny this and say she obtained only a limited estate. In our opinion, the defendants are right.

6. The question at issue is a simple one of construction. The award is Ex. A-1. The operative portion runs thus :

"Having regard to the specifications given above, Brij Lal, first party, and Mst. Mohan Devi, the deceased s female issue, second party, have been held entitled to shares, worth Rs. 28,500 and Rs. 42,482-10 respectively in the said properties; and accordingly ... two lots have been made and the first lot is allotted to the first party and the second lot to the second party; and henceforth the parties shall have no claim or liability against each other; and each party has become permanent owner (malik mustaqil) of his or her share; and each party should enter in proprietary possession and occupation of his or her respective share . .."

The underlining (here italicised) is ours.

7. We do not think that words admit of any doubt, particularly as the words "malik mustaqil" have been used : see Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal, 1950 S.C.R. 766 at p. 773 and Bishunath Prasad v. Chandika Prasad, 60 Ind. App. 56 at pp. 61 & 62. But it was argued that the award must be viewed as a whole and that certain in earlier passages show that this could not have been the intention. The passages relied on are these. First, the finding that the properties claimed by Mst. Mohan Dai as her own really belonged to Shanker Lal. He had purchased some and acquired others through mortgages in her name but she was only a banamidar and had no title to them. Second, that some of the properties in dispute were ancestral and the rest self-acquired though whether with the help of ancestral funds or not the arbitrator wa