The main legal point established in the judgment is the significance of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury in granting temporary injunction, as well as the court's inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Rajiv Sharma and Zaki Ullah Khan, JJ

Heard Counsel for the appellants and perused the record.

2. The instant FAFO arises out of the judgment and order dated 11.2.2014 passed in Regular Suit No. 100 of 2011 : Smt. Pachcho Vs. Smt. Tej Kumari and others, by Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.20, Lucknow, whereby the application of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC was allowed.

3. Shorn off unnecessary details the facts of the case are as under :

On 16.4.2006, the marriage of appellant No.1-Smt. Tej Kumari was solemnized with Sri Guddu, son of Nihali and out of their wedlock, one son, namely, Sri Prince was born.? Thereafter, Sri Guddu expired. Subsequently, respondent No.1-Smt. Pachcho filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the appellants as well as respondent Nos. 2 and 3 along with an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.? Notices were issued. In response therefore, the appellants appeared and filed their joint objection to the application of the plaintiff filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court below, after hearing the parties, allowed the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the instant FAFO.

4. Counsel for the appellants submits that without considering the facts that the plaintiff had no locus standi to file a suit against the defendants/appellants; the appellant No.1-Smt. Tej Kumari had 50% share in the property left by her husband after his death; and Master Prince (minor), who is son of appellant No.1, is residing with the appellants and the respondent No.1 had no concern with the minor son of the appellant No.1, the Court below has committed an error in restraining the appellant No.1 from utilizing/transferring the entire amount deposited with the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 by means of the impugned ad interim order.

5. Before adjudicating the matter on merit, we think it appropriate to deal with the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC and the circumstances under which the Courts can exercise power and grant temporary or ad interim injunction or reject the same.

6. Rule 1 of Order XXXIX lays down three circumstances where the Courts may grant temporary or interim injunction if the circumstances and facts are proved by affidavit or otherwise. Firstly, where the disputed property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit or from being fully sold in the execution of a decree; secondly where the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with an intention to defraud his creditor; and thirdly where the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff in relation to the disputed property. On proof of these on affidavits, the Court may pass an order restraining or forbearing the defendant from doing such act of wasting, damaging, alienating , sale, removal or dispossession of the property or restrain the defendant from dispossession the plaintiff from the suit property or causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to the disputed property.

7. Similarly, under Rule 2 of Order XXXIX, the Court may, by an order of temporary or interim injunction, restrain the defendant from committing breach of contract or injury complained of arising out of the same contract. However, while exercising the power under Rule 2, the Court must bear in mind that in case where the performance of a contract is not specifically enforced, damages for such breach would be the proper and adequate relief. Then in such cases injunction may not be granted. The Courts must also bear in mind the provisions of Section 41, particularly clause (e) of the Specific Relief Act, while exercising the power under Rule 2 of the Order XXXIX of the Code. According to this Section, the perpetual injunction could not be granted to restrain the b