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2015 Supreme(All) 3284

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Sunita Agarwal, J.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Dharmendra and Ors. - Respondent
C.M.W.P. No. 15845 of 2015
Decided On : 19-05-2015

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Rahul Sahai
For the Respondents: None.

The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory Tribunal, is not a Civil Court of plenary jurisdiction, and hence a writ of certiorari against its order would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Headnote:

Article 226 of Constitution of India - Motor Accident Claims Tribunal - Motor Vehicles Act 1988, Section 165, 168, 169 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Rules 9 to 13, 15 to 30 of Order V; Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI, Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII - The judgment discusses the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. It refers to the distinction between the orders of a Civil Court and a Tribunal, and the powers and procedures of the Claim Tribunal as provided in the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The court also cites relevant case laws and legal principles to establish that the orders of a Civil Court stand on a different footing from the orders of authorities or the Tribunal and are not amenable to correctness in a writ of certiorari. It concludes that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory Tribunal, is not a Civil Court of plenary jurisdiction, and hence a writ of certiorari against its order would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Fact of the Case:

The writ petition arises out of an order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, where the petitioner, an Insurance company, filed a review application against an award of the Tribunal on the ground of fraud committed by the claimant. The review application was dismissed, and the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Finding of the Court:

The court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory Tribunal, is not a Civil Court of plenary jurisdiction, and hence a writ of certiorari against its order would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: The main issue was the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: The court established that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory Tribunal, is not a Civil Court of plenary jurisdiction, and hence a writ of certiorari against its order would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed.

JUDGMENT

Sunita Agarwal, J.

1. Heard Sri Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the petitioner.

2. The present writ petition arises out of an order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

3. Before dealing with the merits of the case, the question arose as to whether the writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India could be maintainable against the order passed by the motor Accident claims Tribunal keeping in view of the judgment of the Apex Court of Civil Appeal No. 2545 of 1009 Radhey Shyam and another V. Chhabi Nath and others, where in it has been held that the judicial order of Civil Court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4. Sri Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the petitioner referring to judgment of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam (supra) submits that a distinction has been carved out between the Civil Court and a Tribunal. Mere reading of paragraph 10, 11 and 21 of the said pronouncement makes it clear that the order of Civil Court stand on a different footing from the orders of a Tribunal.

5. With reference to the provision of section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a statutory Tribunal established by the State Government. By notification of the State Government the area of jurisdiction is specified for the purpose of adjudication of claims under the Act. Section 168 provides the manner in which the Claim Tribunal has to proceed to decide the application for compensation filed under section 166 of the Act. The procedure prescribed therein is a summary procedure.

6. Section 169 deals with the powers and procedures of the Claim Tribunal, a reading of which shows that the powers of a Civil Court are available to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to a limited extent. The Claim Tribunals shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of section 195 of the Act i.e., for the purpose of an enquiry, to impose a fine upon a person convicted for an offence under this Act. Otherwise, it has powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of:

(1) Taking the evidence of

(2) Enforcing attendance of witnesses

(3) Compelling to produce documents

(4) Material object and for such other purposes as may be prescribed.

7. Rule 221 of the Motor Vehicles Rules provides that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 will apply only in certain cases. Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; OrderIX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI, Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII of the C.P.C. would be applicable in a Civil proceeding before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

8. A Full bench of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Janki Devi and others, 1982 (8) ALR 460 (FB) has held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court but is a Statutory Tribunal, the incidents of which are governed entirely by the provisions of the Act.

9. Having heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and a careful reading of judgment of Apex Court in "Radhey Shyam" would show that the referred question in "Radhey Shyam" before the Apex Court was as to whether the view taken in Surya Devi Rai v. Ram Chandra, 2003 (52) ALR 707 (SC) that the writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies against the order of Civil Court is the correct view or not. The question before the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam arose out of a proceeding in an Original Suit pending before the Civil Court. Assailing the interim injunction of the Civil Court in the pending suit, the writ petition was filed before the High Court and the interim injunction granted by the Civil Court was vacated. Hence the aggrieved party moved to the Apex Court by filing a Special Leave Petition. The contention was that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable against the order of Civil Court.

10. Considering the earlier nine Judges Bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra, A




































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