Hon’ble Siddharth, J.—Heard Sri Nisheeth Yadav, learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.

2. The petitioner has filed the above noted writ petition, praying for the quashing of the order dated 25.7.1996, passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jhansi Range, Jhansi, whereby, the petitioner has been dismissed from service.

3. The only argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that though it is true that the petitioner was convicted in Sessions Trial No. 542 of 1983, under Section 109 I.P.C. for Abetment of Murder by Sessions Judge, Lucknow, he preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1137 of 1985, wherein, he was enlarged on bail, but the disciplinary authority has passed the order dated 25.7.1996, dismissing the petitioner from service, without considering at all the conduct of the petitioner, which led to his conviction and whether petitioner was liable for punishment of dismissal or any other punishment. He vehemently contended that a bare perusal of impugned order itself shows that disciplinary authority has proceeded on the assumption that as soon as a Government servant is convicted, dismissal from service is natural consequence thereof and accordingly the impugned order has been passed.

4. The learned Standing Counsel has argued that the conviction of the petitioner was sufficient to dismiss him from service since the order of conviction was passed by a competent Criminal Court, on the basis of the evidence led before it against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority was justified in passing the impugned order against the petitioner, since the final word regarding his misconduct has come from the Criminal Court.

5. After hearing the Counsels for the parties, it is no doubt true that mere pendency of an appeal against an order of conviction does not bar imposition of punishment under Article 311 (2) (a) proviso of Constitution read with Rule 8 (2) (a) of U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment & Appeal) Rules,1991 and the disciplinary authority, on the basis of conduct, which led to conviction, may consider appropriate punishment, if any, liable to be imposed upon Government servant and without holding any departmental inquiry can impose such punishment, but it is also a settled exposition of law that punishment is not automatic and based on mere conviction but the order imposing punishment must show application of mind on the part of disciplinary authority on the conduct, which led to conviction of Government servant.

6. In the present case, the order passed by disciplinary authority does not show at all any consideration in the part of disciplinary authority that he has considered conduct of petitioner, which led to his conviction and appropriate punishment ought to be awarded to the petitioner. On the contrary a bare reading of the order shows that disciplinary authority, on the assumption that dismissal is the natural consequence of conviction of petitioner in a criminal case, has passed the impugned order of dismissal.

7. The question whether the order must disclose application of mind on the part of disciplinary authority that it has considered conduct led to conviction of Government servant before passing punishment order is no more res inegra.

8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the authorities were required to consider the conduct of the petitioner which had led to his conviction on the criminal charge before imposing maximum punishment of dismissal from service. Before proceeding further it would be necessary to advert to the Article 311 of the Constitution of India, which is as follows,

“Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union of State

(1). No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India Service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subor