Judgment

CHANDRACHUD, CJI.:- Cases which evoke sympathy come frequently before the Court. But pity not often. The case before us has a unique story to tell the story of a crime committed under the stress of personal misery compounded by the apathy of the Establishment and the appalling delays of law. Ironically the silver lining is furnished by the bravery of a broken man who has been fighting against injustice for the last 23 years. When justice is done or so the Judges believe the conscience assuaged. But in this case, despite our doing all that can be done for the appellant within the framework of law we have an uneasy conscience. Delay not only defeats justice and robs it of its immediate relevance to the parties but it shakes the very confidence of the people in the desire and ability of law courts to assist them when they need that assistance most.

2. The appellant was retrenched by the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Government of India in 1960. whereupon he was employed as a Cash Clerk by the Delhi Milk Supply Scheme Department which is under the administrative control of the Government of India. In 1962 he was prosecuted for breach of trust in respect of a sum of Rs. 500/-. He repaid that amount and pleaded guilty to the charge. Accepting that plea the learned Magistrate. First Class, Delhi convicted him under S. 409 of the Penal Code but in view of the peculiar circumstances relating to the crime and the criminal he released him under S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. As a result of the conviction the appellant was dismissed from service summarily with effect from April 14. 1964.

3. The appellant filed a suit in 1966 in the court of the Sub-Judge. First Class, Delhi for setting aside his dismissal from service mainly on the ground that since he was released under the Probation of Offenders Act, it was not permissible to the authorities to visit him with the penalty of dismissal from service. That suit was dismissed on the ground that since the appellant was convicted of a criminal charge he was liable to be dismissed under Cl. (a) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The decree of the trial court was confirmed by the learned Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi in January 1968. The appellant filed Second Appeal No. 142 of 1968 in the High Court of Delhi which was allowed by D. K. Kapur. J. on April 13. 1971. The learned Judge accepted the contention of the appellant that by reason of the provision contained in S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act he could not be dismissed from service without affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard as required by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. The Government of India filed a Letters Patent Appeal against that judgment, which was allowed by Jagjit Singh and R. N. Aggarwal, JJ. on October 10, 1972. This appeal of the year 1972 has come up for hearing in this Court more than 11 years after it was filed.

4. Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act must be placed out of way first. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of S. 3 or 4 "shall not suffer disqualification" attaching to a conviction for an offence under such law. The order of dismissal from service consequent upon a conviction is not a "disqualification" within the meaning of S. 12. There are statutes which provide that persons who are convicted for certain offences shall incur certain disqualifications. For example. Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. entitled "Disqualifications for membership of Parliament and State Legislatures" and Chapter IV entitled "Disqualifications for Voting" contain provisions which disqualify persons convicted of certain charges from being members of legislatures or from voting at elections to legislatures. That is the sense in which the word "disqualification" is used in S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Therefore, it is no