Hon’ble Rajan Roy, J.—Heard Shri Prabhat Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Gaurav Mehrotra alongwith Shri Kunal Shah, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3.

2. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the revisional authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (For short ‘the Act, 1972'). The petition is by the tenants.

3. Sri Prabhat Kumar learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that on the date of notice the property in dispute was an open land as admitted by the landlord, therefore, the suit would not lie before the SCC Court, it would lie before the regular Civil Court in view of Section 15 read with Schedule-II (State Amendment) of the U.P. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, as, once it was the case of the opposite party No. 3 herein that the building which had been let out had got demolished, then, the very basis of tenancy had ceased to exist, therefore, the proceedings were essentially for eviction from the open land per se, as such, the competent forum was the Regular Civil Court.

4. The contention of Shri Kunal Shah holding brief of Shri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3 is that it is an admitted factual position that the tenanted premises were let out for residential purposes much prior to its purchase by his client in the year 1970 and that the tenancy continued even thereafter. However, at some stage the building got demolished, a fact has been denied by the petitioners, but this does not mean that the tenancy ceased to exist as, in view of the definition of ‘building’ it means land appurtenant to the building. The definition of building contained in Section 3(i) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 when read conjointly with enunciation of the meaning of ‘building’ by the Supreme Court in its decisions the land beneath it and appurtenant thereto is also part of it, therefore, even after demolition not only the building as defined aforesaid, continues to exist, but, the tenancy also subsists, in respect of which, the petitioners did not pay the rent since 1970, hence, a notice was given seeking arrears of rent and also on the ground that the structure no longer being in existence and the petitioner having illegally set up a ‘Gumti’ thereon contrary to the purpose for which the tenancy was created thereby changing the use for commercial purposes, seeking his eviction therefrom, and the Courts below had concurrently held that the petitioners were in arrears of rent and there was veritably no contest on this issue. The only issue raised by the petitioners being one of jurisdiction of the SCC Court to deal with such matters on the premise that what remains now is open land, it is absolutely misconceived, as, the dispute relates to tenancy in respect of a ‘building’ as defined under Section 3(i) of the Act, 1972, which continues to exist in the eyes of law, therefore, the jurisdiction was with the SCC Court and it was not a dispute where his client was seeking possession of open land per se i.e. bereft of the tenanted premises and the tenancy. In support of his contention he relied upon judgments rendered in case of Vannattakandy Ibrayi v. Kunhabdulla Haje, (2001) 1 SCC 564, T. Lakshmipathi v. P. Nithyananda Reddy, (2003) 5 SCC 150, Shaha Ratansi Khimji & Sans v. Kumghar Sons Hotel (P) Ltd., (2014) 14 SCC 1, Dr. Kundan Lal v. Shamshad Ahmad, AIR 1966 All 225 and Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah, 1996 (6) SCC 342.

5. In reply Shri Kumar submitted that none of the decisions cited by Sri Shah apply in the present case, as, in those cases the issue was pending before the Regular Civil Court and the question of competent forum i.e. whether the suit will lie before the SCC Court or not was not directly involved. He also submitted that in view of the definition of ‘building’ under Section 3(i) of the Act, 1972 the land benea