IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
Mohit - Appellant
Versus
Saloni Lal - Respondent
S.C.C. Revision No. 69 of 2019
Decided On : 29-05-2019
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 – Section 17 – Order IX – Rule 13 – Crimi8nal Procedure – Appeal against Conviction – Application filed seeking recall of ex parte order and it was only that application bearing Application Ga filed before Court of Additional District Judge, seeking permission to deposit decretal amount. court below referring to provisions contained legal proposition with regard to mandatory nature of said provision has rejected application on ground that the application seeking to deposit decretal amount was beyond prescribed time period –Held Jurisdiction is wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. But pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence may not be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act. Court also explained the circumstances under which, findings can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25. There are very limited grounds on which there can be interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25; they are, when (i) findings are perverse or (ii) based on no material or (iii) findings have been arrived at upon taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence or (iv) findings have been arrived at without consideration of relevant evidence – Revision dismissed. (Para 8, 16)
Facts of the case:
Application filed seeking recall of ex parte order and it was only that application bearing Application Ga filed before Court of Additional District Judge, seeking permission to deposit decretal amount court below referring to provisions contained legal proposition with regard to mandatory nature of said provision has rejected application on ground that the application seeking to deposit decretal amount was beyond prescribed time period.
Findings of the court:
Jurisdiction is wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. But pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence may not be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act. Court also explained the circumstances under which, findings can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25. There are very limited grounds on which there can be interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25; they are, when (i) findings are perverse or (ii) based on no material or (iii) findings have been arrived at upon taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence or (iv) findings have been arrived at without consideration of relevant evidence.
Result: Revision dismissed.
JUDGMENT :
Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.
Heard Sri Vikram Suryavanshi, Advocate holding brief of Sri Vinay Kumar Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the revisionist.
2. The present revision has been filed against the judgment dated 25.04.2019 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act)/Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No.8, Ghaziabad rejecting application (Application No.4ga) filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for recall of the ex parte order dated 22.08.2017 in SCC Suit No.08 of 2017 (Saloni Lal Vs. Mohit).
3. The undisputed facts of the case are that the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was filed on 21.09.2017 seeking recall of the ex parte order dated 22.08.2017, and it was only on 19.03.2019 that an application bearing Application No.22 Ga was filed before the Court of Additional District Judge, Court No.9, Ghaziabad seeking permission to deposit the decretal amount. The court below referring to the provisions contained under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 and the legal proposition with regard to mandatory nature of the said provision has rejected the application on the ground that the application seeking to deposit the decretal amount under Section 17 was beyond the prescribed time period.
4. Contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is not mandatory in nature but is directory, and the court below ought to have adopted a liberal approach and allowed the application of the revisionist to deposit the decretal amount.
5. The issue which is sought to be raised in the present case is no longer res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement made in the case of Kedarnath Vs. Mohan Lal Kesarwari & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 16 wherein it has been held that the language of proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act, 1887 is mandatory, and the application for setting aside the decree must be accompanied by deposit in court of amount due or preceded by an application seeking leave to furnish security. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:-
"5. It is not disputed at the Bar that such a suit as was filed by the appellant-landlord is, in the State of U.P., to be heard and disposed of by a Court of Small Causes and hence would be governed by the provisions of the PSCC Act. Section 17 thereof provides as under:
"17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.--(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, save insofar as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits:
Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.
(2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the proviso to sub-section (1), the security may be realized in manner provided by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
It is relevant to note that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 has undergone a material change through an amendment brought in by Act 9 of 1935. Earlier these were the words -- "security to the satisfaction of the court for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment, as the court may direct" which have been deleted and substituted by the present words -- "such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed". The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1935 amendment was set out as under:
"The Act is designed to remove certain doub
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