Point of Law
Right available under sub-section 3 of Section 19 of the Act, would not be available against an interlocutory order which does not affect the vital rights of the aggrieved person.

JUDGMENT :

Pankaj Naqvi, J.

Heard Sri Navin Sinha, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Vimlendu Tripathi for the appellants, Sri Ashok Khare, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare, Sri Manish Goyal, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri K.K. Rao, Sri Kshitij Shailendra and Sri V.K. Upadhya, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Krishna Raj Jadaun for the respective respondents in Contempt Appeal Nos. 6/2019, 3/2020 and 4/2020 and Sri Ajit Kumar Singh, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava for the appellants and Sri Nand Lal Pandey / Sri Sunil Kumar Srivastava for the respective respondents in Contempt Appeal Nos. 1 & 2, both of 2020, both on maintainability as also on merits.

Since common issues are involved in all the five connected appeals, same are being disposed of by a common order. Contempt Appeal No.6/2019 is taken up as leading appeal.

1. Contempt Appeal No.6/2019 is preferred under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short “the Act”) against the order dated 04.12.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge, framing charges against the appellant and respondent nos. 3 to 8, calling upon them to file their response, if any, on or before the next date.

2. Sri Siddharth Khare, the learned counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2 (petitioners in contempt) on the strength of the Apex Court judgment in Midnapore People's Co-operative Bank vs Chunnilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC 399 submits that the contempt appeal is not maintainable.

3. Per contra, Sri Navin Sinha, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant controverts the preliminary objection that as Midnapore (supra) did not refer to previous decision of the Apex Court in R.N Dey and others vs Bhagyabati Pramanik and others, 2000 (4) SCC 400, which had held that the orders passed by the Contempt Court in exercise of jurisdiction to punish, an appeal under Section 19 of the Act would be maintainable. He thus submits that Midnapore would not be an impediment to the maintainability of this appeal. He further submitted that once the Legislature used two expressions i.e. 'order or decision' under sub-section 1 of Section 19 of the Act disjunctively while the word “decision” does not find mention in sub-section 3, the logical inference is that even though an order of punishment may not have come to be passed, yet an appeal under Section 19 of the Act would be maintainable in respect of orders prior to the order of punishment. He placed reliance on ECL Finance Ltd. vs Harikishan Shankarji Gudipati and others, (2018) 13 SCC 142, Sadhna Upadhyay vs. State of U.P., 2009 (65) ACC 64 (FB), T. George Joseph, Principal Secretary, Tax Registration Government of U.P., Lucknow vs. Vijay Kumar Srivastava, 2003(5) AWC 4247 in support of the contention. He finally submitted that once a review is pending against the order of the writ court of which contempt is alleged, contempt is to be deferred for which he relied on Satyendra Singh vs. Saroj Rani and others, (2017) 11 SCC 471.

4. The preliminary issue raised before us is in regard to the maintainability of the contempt appeal under Section 19 of the Act. It is well settled that an appeal is a creature of a statute. An appeal can be filed only in respect of orders against which a right of appeal is conferred under the statute. Section 19 of the Act in so far relevant reads as under:

19. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-

(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;

(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:

Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that—

(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be su