The court emphasized the importance of 'sufficient cause' and the satisfaction of the court in condoning delay, and highlighted that inordinate delay could not be condoned without notice to the respondents and without recording any reasons for condonation of delay.

JUDGMENT :

Shree Prakash Singh, J.

1. Heard Sri Q. M. Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J.P. Maurya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and perused the record.

2. Instant writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 21.2.2003 passed by the appellate authority as well as the order dated 17.2.1975 passed by the Prescribed Authority.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in fact a proceeding under Section 10(2) of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 was commenced and the case was instituted as Ceiling Case No. 83 wherein misinterpreting the records, the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), vide order dated 17.2.1975 determined 54.4 acres of land as surplus land from the holdings of the petitioner. He admits that against the aforesaid order, the petitioner filed Appeal No. 244 of 1975 before the District Judge, Gonda wherein operation of the order impugned was stayed during the pendency of the appeal.

4. He further submitted that, due to the change of jurisdiction as per the amendment in the Ceiling Act, the matter was transferred from the court of District Judge to the Divisional Commissioner, Faizabad. The aforesaid appeal was dismissed in default on 28.12.1988. He further added that a fresh proceeding, after the amendment of Ceiling Act, was initiated and fresh notices were issued showing 49.08 acres of land as surplus land from the holdings of the petitioner. The petitioner filed objection to the aforesaid notice. After hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority declared 5.12 acres of land as surplus from the holdings of the petitioner. He submits that the order dated 29.7.1976 had become final as the State did not file any appeal against the same.

5. He argued that later on, the State filed an appeal on 20.9.2002 after delay of 26 years and assailed the order dated 29.7.1976. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention towards Annexure No. 7, which is the order of appellate authority dated 21.2.2003 by which the appellate authority admitted the appeal; condoned the delay; and issued notices to the petitioner. He submits that it is evident from the order itself that no notice was issued on the application for condonation of delay and, on the first date of hearing, i.e., at the admission stage, delay was condoned by the appellate authority without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

6. He also submits that in fact delay of 26 years has been condoned without calling any objection and without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which is impermissible under settled proposition of law. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the order of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Ragho Singh Vs. Mohan Singh and others, (2001) 9 SCC 717 wherein the Apex Court has held that appeal filed before the Additional Collector was beyond ten days and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed and, in that view of the matter, the Apex Court has held that such appeal is liable to be dismissed. Para 6 of that Judgment reads as under:-

"6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Since it is not disputed that the appeal filed before the Additional Collector was beyond time by 10 days and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed for condonation of delay, there was no jurisdiction in the Additional Collector to allow that appeal. The appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Board of Revenue before which the question of limitation was agitated was of the view that though an application for condonation of delay was not filed, the delay shall be deemed to have been condoned. This is patently erroneous. In this situation, the High Court was right in setting aside the judgment of the Additional Collector as also of the Board of Revenue. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. No costs."

7. Learned counsel