JUDGMENT :

Saumitra Dayal Singh, J.

Heard Sri Alok Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for the State.

2. Present writ petition has been filed by the Distribution Corporation. It arises from the award of the Permanent Lok Adalat, Kasganj dated 17.1.2022 passed in Case No. 46 of 2021 (Smt. Pinki Yadav v. Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division, Urban, Prabhu Park, Kasganj and another. The petitioners also seek to assail the constitutional validity of Section 22-A(b)(iii) of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned Act').

3. During the course of hearing, submissions were advanced as to the validity issues. Merit issues giving rise to the award have not been questioned.

4. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is, the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') with the U.P. Electricity Supply Code, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') read together, constitute the special law to deal with all challenges that may arise to any assessment order or demand raised under those Acts. Thus, referring to Section 135 of the Act and Clause 6.5 of the Code, it has been submitted, the only remedy available to the respondent/consumer was to have filed objections to the demand raised or to institute appeal proceedings at the appropriate stage. In face of such specific remedy provided under the special law, no parallel remedy could have been provided under the impugned Act. He has further placed reliance on Section 185 of the Act to submit that the said Act is a later Act, and therefore, the provision of the impugned Act including Section 22A(b)(iii) read with Section 22-C of the impugned Act would stand overridden.

5. To bolster his submission, learned counsel for the petitioners has further referred to Section 20(1)(i)(a) of the impugned Act. Referring to the proceedings conducted by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Kasganj in Case No. 46 of 2021, dated 19.11.2021. It has been submitted, the terms of compromise proposed by the Permanent Lok Adalat had been rejected by the petitioners. Thus, there was no agreement reached between the parties as may have allowed the Permanent Lok Adalat to continue the proceedings or to adjudicate the dispute.

6. He has further placed reliance on Section 22-D of the impugned Act to submit that adjudication could arise only if the petitioners had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat. Since the petitioners refused the terms of settlement, the jurisdiction never arose.

7. Before dealing with the submission thus advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, it may be noted that the vires of the provisions of the impugned Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in Bar Council of India v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 243.

8. As to the specific challenge raised in the present petition, it cannot be lost sight, the Permanent Lok Adalat has been constituted under the impugned Act, under Chapter VI-A thereto as inserted by Act No. 37 of 2002, w.e.f. 11.6.2002. The constitution of the Permanent Lok Adalat, its jurisdiction and procedure are governed exclusively by the provisions contained in Chapter VI-A of the impugned Act. The provision of Section 20 of the impugned Act referred to by learned counsel for the petitioners are therefore wholly inapplicable. They apply to regular Lok Adalats only. The submission to the contrary is plainly misconceived.

9. As to the main submission being advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, the same is also found to be misconceived. In the first place, there is no inherent constitutional invalidity in two remedies being provided by the law. The only issue that may arise in a given case is - which of the two remedies may be availed first and if availment of one remedy would debar the other. However that issue does not exist in the present case. Yet, the answer lies in Section 22-C(1) of the impugned Act. Since no prior proceeding was instituted by