Point of Law : Position of law, settled overtime, is that if an inquiry is held ex-parte, ex-parte delinquent must be put to notice of date, time and venue of inquiry, where, if he so chooses, he can exercise his right to cross-examine the establishment witnesses - But this has not been apparently done as course of proceedings evident from inquiry report would show.

JUDGMENT :

This is a respondents' appeal, arising out of a judgment of the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No. 10967 of 2022, allowing the writ petition.

2. Heard Mr. Sankalp Narain, learned Counsel for the respondent-appellants, Mr. H.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Syed Fahim Ahmad, learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent and the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 3.

3. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was an assistant teacher with appellant No.1, a Madarsa governed by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (for short, 'the Act of 2004'). He taught in the primary section of the Madarsa called, 'the Tahtaniya'. Some complaints were made against him, of which the appellants took cognizance and proceeded to hold disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner-respondent. The Inquiry Committee, that was constituted, submitted its report dated June 25, 2021. Taking the findings of the Inquiry Committee into account, the appellants passed the impugned order dated July 11, 2021, terminating the writ petitioner-respondent's services.

4. Aggrieved by that order, the writ petitioner-respondent (for short, 'the writ petitioner') instituted Writ-A No. 10967 of 2022, which has been allowed by the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. The respondent Management have appealed the said order passed by the learned Single Judge by means of the present appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court.

5. The learned Single Judge has primarily proceeded to quash the impugned order of termination from service on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It has been opined by the learned Single Judge that the right of the respondent-appellants to proceed against an employee, including a teacher in their disciplinary jurisdiction, flows from Section 24 of the Act of 2004 and the Regulations framed thereunder, called, The Uttar Pradesh Non-Governmental Arabic and Persian Madarsa Recognition, Administration and Services Regulation, 2016 (for short, 'the Regulations of 2016'). The learned Single Judge has held that the Regulations of 2016 make it imperative that disciplinary proceedings can be taken against an employee or a teacher of an institution governed by the Act of 2004 only in accordance with the duly approved scheme of administration.

6. The learned Single Judge has looked into the provisions of Government Orders dated January 7, 2022 and January 10, 2022 issued to effectuate the purpose of Regulation 16 of the Regulations of 2016, which have been found to say that any disciplinary action taken against a teacher or other employee of Madarsa, without there being an approved scheme of administration for the institution concerned, would be void. The learned Judge has recorded a finding that the Government Orders dated January 7, 2022 and January 10, 2022 are still in force. There is a further finding that the scheme of administration for the appellant's Institution has been framed and sent for approval to the Government under a Covering Memo dated July 8, 2021. But, the said scheme is pending with the State Government for approval. The learned Judge, therefore, held that there is no approved scheme of administration for the appellant's Institution.

7. The effect of these gamut of statutory provisions is that the wanting State approval to the appellants' scheme of administration has led the learned Judge to hold that bearing in mind the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2004, Regulation 16 of the Regulations and the Government Orders dated January 7, 2022 and January 10, 2022, the appellant-Institution (for short, ‘the appellants’) would have no jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner, unless their scheme of administration is approved. It is on this ground that the learned Judge has found that the appellants do not have the authority to pass the impugned order of terminati