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2010 Supreme(UK) 114
2010 (2) UAD 32
UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarun Agarwala
Writ Petition No.889 of 2008 (M/S) WITH
Writ Petitions No. 880, 885 to 888, 890, 891, 1091 to 1096, 1105, 1106 and
340 of 2008 (M/S); 1376 to 1380, 1390 to 1397, 1589 to 1598, 1610, 1645,
1646, 1648 and 1649 of 2009 (M/S)
DIVISIONAL MARKETING MANAGER – Petitioner
Versus
STATE & ORS. – Respondents
Decided on : 19.03.2010
Headnote:(A) U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sec. 4-K — Limitation prescribed for reference of disputes — There was no limitation prescribed for reference of a dispute to a Labour Court or a Tribunal and that it is only reasonable that a dispute should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed — More so, when the dispute relates to a dismissal, discharge or retrenchment of the workman — Also, that the dispute which is stale should not be a subject matter of reference u/S 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act — Held that as to when a dispute could be said to become stale or old would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. (Paras 25 to 27)
(B) U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sec. 3(d), U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, Rule 4 — Indications under — An application for settlement of an industrial dispute could not ordinarily be entertained by the Conciliation Officer, if the said application was filed after 6 months from the date of the dispute — But, the Conciliation Officer could entertain such an application in case, where he was satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application earlier. (Paras 14, 15)
(C) U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sec. 4-K, U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, Rule 4 — Word 'exists' in relation to an industrial dispute or in relation to a dispute being apprehended has to be read in conjunction with the words 'at any time' — These words are complementary to each other — Powers of the Conciliation Officer to settle a dispute in conciliation proceedings has limitations of time, namely, that it can be done only so long as the dispute exists or is apprehended — If an opinion is formed that a dispute exists, then it become immaterial about the number of years which have elapsed.
(Para 28)
¼v½ mRrj izns'k vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947] /kkjk 4K & fooknksa ds nk;js gsrq fu/kkZfjr fyfeVs'ku & fdlh Je U;k;ky; vFkok vf/kdj.k easa fdlh fookn ds nk;js ds okLrs dksbZ fyfeVs'ku fuf'pr ugha gS vkSj tks gS og dsoy mfpr le;kof/k gS ftlds vUrxZr dksbZ Hkh fookn mlds mRié gksus ds rqjUr i'pkr vkSj le>kSrk okrkZ foQy gks tkus ds i'pkr gS & bl ij Hkh tc fookn fdlh dkexkj dh NaVuh ;k c[kkZLrxh ;k lsok eqfDr ls lEcfU/kr gks & mRrj izns'k vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 4K ds v/khu tks fookn chr dkyhu gks pqdk gks dks Hkh okn fcUnq u cuk;k tk, & fu.kZ; esa dgk x;k fd fdlh fookn dks dkykrhr vFkok iqjkuk dc dgk tk,xk] og fookn ds rF;ksa vkSj ifjfLFkfr;ksa ij fuHkZj djsxkA ¼izLrj 25 ls 27½
¼c½ mRrj izns'k vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947] /kkjk 3(d) & m-iz- vkS|ksfxd fookn fu;ekoyh] 1957] fu;e 4 & ds vUrxZr fdlh vkS|ksfxd fookn ds fuLrkj.k gsrq nk;j izkFkZuk i= lkekU;r;k le>kSrk vf/kdkjh }kjk ml n'kk esa ugha lquk tk ldsxk ;fn dfFkr izkFkZuk i= fookn mRié gksus ds 6 ekg ckn nk;j fd;k x;k Fkk & ijUrq le>kSrk vf/kdkjh }kjk ,sls izkFkZuk i= dks ml n'kk esa lquk tk ldsxk ;fn og bl ckr ls larq"V Fkk fd izkFkhZ ds ikl iwoZ esa izkFkZuk i= nk;j u djus dk i;kZIr dkj.k miyC/k FkkA ¼izLrj 14] 15½
¼l½ mRrj izns'k vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947] /kkjk 4K & m-iz- vkS|ksfxd fookn fu;ekoyh] 1957] fu;e 4 & vkS|ksfxd fookn ds lEcU/k esa 'kCn fo|eku (exists) vFkok fdlh laaHkkfor vkS|ksfxd fookn ds lEcU/k esa fdlh le; Hkh (at any time) ds lkFk tksM+dj i<+k tkuk pkfg, & ;s 'kCn ,d nwljs ds lgiwjd gS & le>kSrk vf/kdkjh ds vf/kdkj fdlh le>kSrk okrkZ dh dk;Zokgh esa le; ls ikcUn gS mnkgj.kkFkZ ;g dsoy rHkh rd lquk tk ldrk gS tc rd fookn fo|eku gS rc mlds ckn ;g chrs gq, o"kks± dh la[;k ds fy, fujFkZd gks tkrk gSA ¼izLrj 28½
This group of petitions assails the validity and legality of the order passed by the Conciliation Officer whereby the application of the workman to condone the delay in referring the matter for conciliation of the dispute was allowed. In all this group of petitions, the impugned order is more or less the same, though the wordings are slightly different and, in some of them, ex-parte orders have been passed against the petitioners.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition is, that the predecessor of the petitioner, namely, the U.P. Forest Corporation, in the course of its usual business had engaged different kinds of workers either in a permanent capacity or on a daily rated basis or on a causal basis. The services of the workers involved in the present group of writ petitions were dispensed with mostly in the year 1995, but some of them were also dispensed with earlier in the years 1992 and 1993. The reason urged in the petitions is that the predecessor of the petitioners found the workers to be surplus and on account of decrease in the work load, a decision was taken to retrench the workers. It is alleged that junior most persons were retrenched after paying compensation as provided under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
3. Some of the workers, being aggrieved by the retrenchment, soon thereafter, raised an industrial dispute which was eventually referred for adjudication before the Labour Court. The Labour Court, after considering the matter, gave an award holding that the workers were not entitled for any relief and held that the retrenchment was valid. The Labour Court, accordingly, declined to grant any relief to the workers. The workers, being aggrieved by the said award, filed various writ petitions. The writ court allowed the writ petitions holding that the Corporation was required to adhere to the provision of retrenchment compensation and that the provision of Section 6-N was squarely applicable upon the daily rated workers employed by the Corporation. The High Court, accordingly, directed reinstatement of the workers with continuity of service and with backwages.
4. It may be stated here that during the pendency of the writ petitions, the State of Uttarakhand was formed and the petitioner, being the successor in interest, came into existence and, accordingly, the petitioners challenged the order of the writ court before the Supreme Court of India. In the meanwhile, certain workers, who were retrenched in the year 1995, also filed various writ petitions before the High Court questioning the veracity and legality of the retrenchment and dispensation of the service made by the Corporation in the year 1995. These writ petitions were allowed by various judgments of the High Court holding that the dispensation of the services of the workers was illegal and that the workers were liable to be reinstated. These judgments of the High Court were also challenged by the Corporation before the Supreme Court of India and, all these petitions were clubbed together and decided by the Supreme Court by a judgment dated 12.12.2006, namely, in the matter of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and another Vs. Jabar Singh and others (2007) 2 SCC 112. The Supreme Court held that the workers who had filed the writ petition directly before the High Court were not entitled for any relief and that they should have availed an alternative remedy by raising an industrial dispute under the Industrial Law. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court fell into error in entertaining the writ petition, since, there was no exceptional circumstances made out to entertain the writ petition. The Supreme Court further observed that the writ court should have dismissed the claim of the workers on the ground of laches since the workers did not get the dispute adjudicated by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that these workers who had approached the writ court directly were not entitled for reinstatement, backwages
