The main legal principle established is the liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, emphasizing the need to advance substantial justice and the consideration of delays in the interest of justice.

Umesh Chandra Dhyani, J.

1. By means of present Appeal from Order, the appellants seek to set aside the judgments and orders dated 22.10.2005 and 05.07.2008 passed by Addl. District Judge/1st FTC, Roorkee, District Haridwar in Civil Appeal No. 2/2001, Ikbal Ahmad v. Matloob Hasan & others and in Misc. Case No. 53/2005 Ikbal Ahmad v. Matloob Hasan & others and further to re-admit the aforesaid Civil Appeal.

2. The question, which arises for consideration of this Court, in the instant case is - whether an application for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a must or not? Further, whether in the absence of prayer for condoning delay, such delay may be condoned or not? It is an admitted case here that there was a delay of one day on behalf of the defendant-appellant in moving an application for setting aside the dismissal of appeal. The defendant (appellant herein) was the appellant before the first appellate court and, in his absence, a regular civil appeal was dismissed. The suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff by the trial court. Aggrieved against the same, the defendant filed a civil appeal, which, as stated above, was dismissed in his default. He moved an application for setting aside the dismissal of appeal, but there was a delay of one day in moving such application. Although, he had stated in the application that he was suffering from diabetes and, therefore, he could not move such application in time, but there was no averment in the application for re-admission that one day's delay in filing the re-admission application be condoned. The first appellate court, therefore, held that in the absence of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, his appeal could not be readmitted.

3. Reliance is placed upon a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ragho Singh v. Mohan Singh & others, 2001 (9) SCC 717, wherein it was observed:

"6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Since it is not disputed that the appeal filed before the Additional Collector was beyond time by 10 days and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed for condonation of delay, there was no jurisdiction in the Additional Collector to allow that appeal. The appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Board of Revenue before which the question of limitation was agitated was of the view that though an application for condonation of delay was not filed, the delay shall be deemed to have been condoned. This is patently erroneous. In this situation, the High Court was right in setting aside the judgment of the Additional Collector as also of the Board of Revenue. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. No costs."

4. It will be apt to reproduce paras 16, 17 & 18 of a decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dipak Chandra Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar, (2003) 7 SCC 66:

"16. Furthermore, the Representation of the People Act provides for a complete machinery. The right of appeal conferred upon a suitor must be considered from that angle. When an order is passed under Section 98 of the Act, the same may be in terms of either sub-section (1) of Section 86 or otherwise. An appeal lies against a final order. An order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 86 is also final. It may be that in the event an appeal there from is allowed, the matter may be required to be sent back but that would not render an order passed there under as an interlocutory one. It does not take away the concept of the finality attached therewith.

17. Although, there is no direct decision on the point but it appears that this Court in Hari Shankar Jain v. Sonia Gandhi, (2001) 8 SCC 233 entertained an appeal under Section 116A from an order rejecting the Election Petition.

18. Learned counsel then urged that this special leave petition may be treated as an appeal under Section 116-A of the Act. An appeal is required to be filed within 30 days of the order and judgment