The judgment emphasizes the limited grounds for setting aside an arbitral award and the importance of adhering to the prescribed time limitations under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

By means of present appeal from order, the appellant seeks to set aside the award dated 02.07.2015 and the order dated 25.07.2016, passed by learned District Judge, Haridwar, rejecting the challenge to award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

2. A piece of land was acquired by the appellant for construction of National Highway no. 58. As per the provisions of National Highways Act, 1956, in case of dispute between the parties regarding award, the same shall be referred to Arbitrator, who is District Magistrate and whose decision shall be binding on the parties. Accordingly, the matter was taken by respondents to Arbitrator, who, vide award dated 02.07.2015, inter alia, enhanced the amount of compensation, which was challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (here-in-after referred to as ‘the Act’) before District Judge, Haridwar. Application paper no. 4-Ka under Section 34 of the Act was dismissed by learned District Judge, Haridwar, on the ground that the same is time barred. Aggrieved against the same, present appeal from order (A.O.) has been filed by the appellant.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the copy of the award was not supplied to the appellant. According to learned counsel, the same ought to have been served upon the appellant as per Section 31(5) of the Act.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decisions rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Benarsi Krishna Committee and others vs. Karmyogi Shelters Private Ltd, (2012) 9 SCC 496 and State of Maharashtra and others vs. ARK Builders Private Limited, (2011) 4 SCC 616, to show that copy of the award duly signed by the Arbitrator should have been delivered to the appellant. He also drew attention of this Court towards Munsarim’s report dated 28.01.2016, to show that the application under Section 34 of the Act, filed by the appellant, is within time and within the jurisdiction of the court of District Judge, Haridwar. Learned counsel further submitted that misc. application no. 1182 of 2017 filed on behalf of respondent no. 1, along with affidavit and annexures enclosed thereto, cannot be taken on record. By way of filing supplementary affidavit, respondent no. 1 has tried to show that the award dated 02.07.2015 was duly served upon the appellant, in his office, on 15.07.2015. Learned counsel for respondent no. 1 contended that the provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015, will not apply to the instant case, inasmuch as the rights of the respondents were crystallized when the parties referred their matter to the Arbitrator. Amendment came into force on 23.10.2015 and the matter was referred to the Arbitrator much earlier. Arbitrator gave award on 02.07.2015.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that limited period for setting aside arbitral award shall be reckoned not from date copy of award is received by the objector from any source, but from date copy of award duly signed by the Arbitrator is delivered to/received by objector. Per contra, learned counsel for the private respondents submitted that this plea of extended limitation was never taken by the appellant before the District Judge, Haridwar, in objections under Section 34 of the Act.

6. It was held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, that an award contrary to substantive provisions of law or the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or against the terms of contract would be patently illegal and, therefore, would be subject to interference under Section 34(2)(a)(v) of the Act.

7. In Saw Pipes Ltd. case (supra) it was impossible to assess or prove damages, the specified terms of the contract itself had made a provisions in consonance with Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act and, therefore, the award was set aside under Section 34(2). The facts of instant case are entirely different. It is not a case in which substantive