U.C. Dhyani, J.

1. The applicant, by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeks to quash the order dated 08.02.2017, passed by Court of Special Judge, Anti Corruption (CBI) by means of which application under Section 227 read with 239 Cr.P.C. of the applicant has been dismissed and the consequential order dated 08.02.2017 by means of which charge under Sections 7, 13, 1(d) and 13 (2) of EC Act, 1988 and charge under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been framed against the present applicant.

2. A trap was laid by Trap Team. Accused was summoned to face the trial. During the course of trial, an application was moved by the applicant for his discharge. The Trial Court/Special Judge, Anti Corruption, CBI, Dehradun, by an elaborate and well reasoned order, dismissed such an application and, thereafter, framed charge against the accused-applicant. Aggrieved against both the orders, the applicant has preferred present Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

3. Principal allegation against the applicant is that when he was posted as Intelligence Officer in Directorate General, Central Excise Intelligence (DGCEI), Region Dehradun, he demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 20 lacs in August, 2015, in presence of Senior Intelligence Officer, DGCEI, Assistant Director, DGCEI and Intelligence Officer, DGCEI from the complainant. In his capacity as public servant, by corrupt or illegal means, and by abusing his position as Public Servant, he obtained for himself a sum of Rs. 10 lacs as gratification/pecuniary advantage other than legal remuneration from the complainant.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance upon decisions rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court K.S. Panduranga vs. State of Karnatka, reported in (2013) 3 Supreme Court Cases 721 and M.K. Harshan vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1996) 11 Supreme Court Cases 720.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that there should be clinching or corroborative evidence to support the version of the complainant. In M.K. Harshan case (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “unless the Court is satisfied on this aspect, it is difficult to hold that an accused has accepted the illegal gratification or obtained the same within the meaning of Section 5 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, particularly, when the version of the accused appears probable.”

It may be mentioned here that the prosecution evidence has not been adduced in the instant case as yet. The decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court may be applied by the Trial Court only at the time of giving final judgment, after the prosecution evidence is closed. Here, there is no such occasion to apply the decision rendered in M.K. Harshan case (supra) to the facts of the present applicant.

6. Similar is the position with Panduranga’s decision (supra), in which Hon’ble Apex Court rejected the concocted story of loan repayment, demand and acceptance of bribe from the complainant and capability of the accused to show official favour to the complainant. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the High Court and Sessions Court rightly disbelieved concocted and highly improbable story of borrowing of money from PW1.

It may be mentioned here, at the cost of repetition, that the time is not yet ripe for the Trial Court to apply the decision of Panduranga’s case to the facts of instant case, inasmuch as, the prosecution evidence is yet to be adduced before the Trial Court. Only the charge has been framed against the applicant, against which he has filed present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

7. The scope of discharge has been highlighted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions, including the one in Shoraj Singh Ahlawat & others vs State of U.P. & another, AIR 2013 SC 52.

8. First of all, the Court has to see what is the scope of interference in framing of charge? The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shoraj Singh Ahlawat (supra) while relying upon variou