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IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
K.M. Joseph, Alok Singh, JJ.
Ultra Tech Cement Limited – Appellant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & others – Respondents
Special Appeal No. 101, 102 of 2017
Decided On : 18-05-2017
The Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 10A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, which declared all applications for mineral rights received prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act as ineligible, except for certain specified categories. The Court held that the classification made by Section 10A was reasonable and did not violate the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the distinction made between applicants for prospecting licenses and applicants for mining leases in Section 10A(2)(c) was justified and did not amount to discrimination.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a public limited company engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement, had applied for a prospecting license for limestone and shale minerals on 20.06.2012. The application was processed, and a Letter of Intent (LOI) was issued to the appellant on 09.12.2013. Subsequently, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Ordinance, 2015, was promulgated on 12.01.2015, and the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (Amendment Act) was enacted on 26.03.2015. Section 10A of the Amendment Act declared all applications for mineral rights received prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act as ineligible, except for certain specified categories. The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of Section 10A, arguing that it violated the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the classification made by Section 10A was reasonable and did not violate the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the Amendment Act was intended to bring about a regime change in the distribution of mineral rights, with the aim of ensuring transparency, fairness, and equitable distribution of these valuable natural resources. The Court held that the Parliament had the legislative competence to make such a change, and that the classification made by Section 10A was based on intelligible differentia and had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act. The Court also held that the distinction made between applicants for prospecting licenses and applicants for mining leases in Section 10A(2)(c) was justified and did not amount to discrimination. The Court noted that the two types of licenses confer different rights and obligations, and that the conditions for obtaining a mining lease are more stringent than those for obtaining a prospecting license. The Court held that the Parliament was entitled to make a distinction between the two types of licenses, and that the distinction did not violate the principle of equality.
Issues: 1. Whether Section 10A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, which declared all applications for mineral rights received prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act as ineligible, violated the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the distinction made between applicants for prospecting licenses and applicants for mining leases in Section 10A(2)(c) of the Amendment Act amounted to discrimination violative of Article 14 of the Constitution?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The classification made by Section 10A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, was reasonable and did not violate the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Amendment Act was intended to bring about a regime change in the distribution of mineral rights, with the aim of ensuring transparency, fairness, and equitable distribution of these valuable natural resources. The Parliament had the legislative competence to make such a change, and the classification made by Section 10A was based on intelligible differentia and had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act. 2. The distinction made between applicants for prospecting licenses and applicants for mining leases in Section 10A(2)(c) of the Amendment Act was justified and did not amount to discrimination violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The two types of licenses confer different rights and obligations, and the conditions for obtaining a mining lease are more stringent than those for obtaining a prospecting license. The Parliament was entitled to make a distinction between the two types of licenses, and the distinction did not violate the principle of equality.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant, upholding the constitutional validity of Section 10A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015.
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1. These two appeals being connected, we are disposing of the same by this common judgment.
2. Special Appeal No. 101 of 2017 arises from Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1124 of 2015 and Special Appeal No. 102 of 2017 arises from Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1105 of 2015. Appellant in these two appeals is one and the same. The writ petitions were filed seeking the following reliefs (as per WPMS No. 1124 of 2015):
“(a) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to issue formal orders granting Prospecting License to the Petitioner in respect of Land measuring 495.544 ha situated in Tehsil Someshwar, District Almora;
(b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to declare the provisions of Section 10A of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 as being unreasonable, arbitrary and whimsical and therefore violative of Articles 14 and 19(g) of the Constitution and as such liable to be struck down being unconstitutional; and
(c) Further issue a writ of Certiorari thereby quashing the Section 10A of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015.”
3. Appellant is a Public Limited Company engaged, according to it, in the manufacture and sale of cement. It made an application for a prospecting licence for limestone and shale minerals on 20.06.2012 under Rule 9 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules”). It is the case of the appellant that the first respondent State considered the application and passed an order for issuance of a Letter of Intent (LOI) for a prospecting licence. It is done on 09.12.2013. By the said Letter of Intent, seven conditions were stipulated. On 08.01.2014, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 10 of 2014 was filed before this Court challenging the grant of Letter of Intent and this Court issued notice to the appellant apart from the State. It is, further, stated that there is an amended Letter of Intent issued on 24.01.2014. On 24.04.2014, a joint demarcation was carried out, which was endorsed by the Government officials in the Departments of Revenue, Forest and Mining and also the representative of the appellant. On 31.05.2014, appellant requested for extension by three months from 9th June, 2014 for complying with the conditions. It is the appellant’s case that, on 06.08.2014, appellant intimated compliance with conditions of the Letter of Intent. On 11.08.2014, respondent No. 1 granted extension of three months from 9th June, 2014 to 8th September, 2014 purporting to act under Rule 15 of the Rules. Appellant sent letter dated 27.08.2014 to expedite the grant of prospecting licence. It is the further case of the appellant that the Director, Geology and Mining Department, recommended issuance of prospecting licence. On 12.01.2015, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Ordinance came to be promulgated. Still later, on 26.03.2015, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the “Amendment Act”) came to be enacted. It is, thereafter, on 18.05.2015, that the appellant filed the two writ petitions. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petitions.
4. Three contentions appear to have been canvassed by the appellant before the learned Single Judge. Referring to sub-section (1) of Section 10A of the Amendment Act, it was the case of the appellant that it occasioned a breach under Article 14 of the Constitution, insofar as it provided that all applications, which are received prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, were declared ineligible. Treating all applications equally was alleged to occasion transgression of Article 14, as it amounted to treating applications, which would be of different hues, equally, inasmuch as, in some cases, nothing much would have been done on the applications; whereas, in other cases, the applications may have been processed. In the instant cases, the application has progressed to an advance stage, so much so th
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